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Abstract
In this thesis we study the finite-size analysis of two continuous-variables quantum key
distribution schemes. The first one is the one-way protocol using Gaussian modulation of
thermal states and the other is the measurement-device-independent protocol. To do so,
we adopt an efficient channel parameter estimation method based on the assumption of
the Gaussian variables and the central limit theorem introduced by Ruppert et al. [Phys.
Rev. A 90, 062310 (2014)]. Furthermore, we present a composable security analysis of the
measurement device independent protocol for coherent attacks with a channel parameter
estimation that is not based on the central limit theorem.
We also investigated, in the asymptotic regime, an asymmetric situation for the authen-
ticated parties against the eavesdropper caused by fast-fading channels. Here we assume
that the eavesdropper has the full control of the communication channel and can instan-
taneously change its transmissivity in every use of it. We assumed the simple model of
a uniform fading and addressed the cases of one-way protocols, continuous-measurement-
device-independent protocol in symmetric configuration and its star network extension for
three users. Finally, we extended the asymptotic study of the one-way protocols using
an arbitrary number of phase-encoded coherent states assuming a thermal loss channel
without using a Gaussian approximation.
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2.1 A vacuum state |0〉 is associated with a circle of unit radius (quantum shot
noise) centred in the origin (zero mean). We can obtain a coherent states
|a〉 after applying a displacement operator Dˆ(a) which changes only the
first moment of the vacuum state to x¯ = (Re[a], Im[a]). A thermal state
is associated with a circle with variance 2n¯ + 1 larger than the shot noise
(gray circle) centred in the origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 A vertical ellipse is associated with a p-quadrature squeezed state |0, r < 0〉
and a horizontal with a q-quadrature squeezed state |0, r > 0〉 respectively.
The displacement operator D(a) is acting on a squeezed state affecting only
its first moment witch finally goes to x¯ = (Re[a], Im[a]). For comparison,
the vacuum state is presented here with a circle of unit radius (dashed circle). 42
2.3 This is the dilation of the channel E for an input state ρˆ and environment
state ρˆE under the global unitary evolution U with output ρˆ
′ = E(ρˆ). If
ρˆE = |Φ〉E〈Φ| is a pure state then the dilation is called Stinespring dilation. 45
2.4 Here is the Stinespring dilation of a channel unique up to partial isometries
U˜ . Due to this fact, the environment can be expressed as an ensemble of
modes {E, e}, where the modes in e are found in vacuum states. Further-
more, this channel is expressed through its canonical form C with U and
W the input and output modes respectively. The canonical form is further
reduced to a three-mode Gaussian unitary operator L acting on the input
mode and to a two-mode squeezed vacuum state |ν〉〈ν|. . . . . . . . . . . . 46
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3.1 Schematic configuration of the protocol: Alice prepares coherent states
(gray disks) in mode A with modulated amplitude by a Gaussian distri-
bution with variance VM = µ− 1 and µ equal with the radius of the black
circle (phase space representqation of Alice’s average state). Then mode A
is send through the channel found under the control of Eve to Bob. For
most of the canonical forms the channel can be represented by Eve possesing
two modes e0 and e1 found in a TMSV state with variance ω and a sym-
plectic transformation M acting only on mode A and e1. Then the output
mode B is measured by Bob either with a homodyne measurement applyed
randomly on its q or p quadrature or else with a heterodyne measurement. 56
3.2 Individual attacks are described by the interaction of each Eve’s ancillary
mode with a signal by a unitary operator U . The output mode is measured
directly after the interaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 In collective attacks Eve is interacting with each signal separately during
the interception by correlating an ancillary mode which is stored in a quan-
tum memory. After the end of the protocol (classical communication) Eve
applies an optimal measurement simultaneously to all the ancillary modes
for every use of the channel. Thus collective attacks are considered more
powerful than the individual ones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 During a coherent attack Eve prepares a global ancillary system which
interacts with every signal with a global unitary operator. The outputs
of the interaction corresponding to the ancillary system are stored in a
quantum memory, to which an optimal joint measurement is applied after
the end of the protocol and the classical communication between Alice and
Bob. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 The secret key rate for direct reconciliation (solid lines) and reverse rec-
onciliation (dashed lines) versus the attenuation in dB. The black lines
correspond to the protocol with the homodyne detection while the grey
lines to the protocol with the heterodyne detection. We have plotted the
ideal case for ξ = 1 and VM → ∞ given by the corresponding formulas in
Eq. (3.40–3.43). We can see that the rates with reverse reconciliation can
beat the 3dB limit in contrast to the rates with direct reconciliation. . . . . 63
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3.6 The security thresholds for of the direct reconciliation (solid lines) and re-
verse reconciliation (dashed lines) with respect the transmissivity τ and
excess noise ϵ. The black lines correspond to the switching protocol (ho-
modyne detection) and the gray ones to the protocol without switching
(heterodyne detection). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.7 Secret key rate versus modulation variance VM of the reverse reconciliation
protocol using homodyne detection. The solid lines correspond to recon-
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corresponding transmissivities. We can see that the value of the secret key
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3.8 Alice prepares mode A in one of the four coherent states with radius z and
sends it to Bob through a thermal-loss channel dilated into an entangling-
cloner attack. In particular, the beam splitter has transmissivity τ , char-
acterizing the channel loss, and the variance ω ≥ 1 of Eve’s TMSV state
provides additional thermal noise to the channel. Eve’s output modes are
stored in a quantum memory measured at the end of the protocol, i.e., after
the entire quantum communication and Alice and Bob’s classical communi-
cation. At the output of the channel, Bob applies an heterodyne detection
to mode B. An upper bound on the performance of the parties can be com-
puted by assuming that also Bob has a quantum memory that he measures
at the end of the entire communication process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
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7.1 (Color online) This figure focuses on the key-rate in the optical regime. The
left panel describes the key rate versus channel attenuation given in dB. The
red solid curve describes the ideal key-rate, using just coherent states. The
blue-dashed curve describes the ideal key rate assuming a preparation noise
with variance Vth = 9 SNU. Then, we keep the same Vth and plot the finite-
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we assume pure loss attack ω = 1 while ξ = 0.98. The plot shows the
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for different values of the preparation noise Vth = 0, 1, 10, 100, 150 SNU,
from top to bottom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Quantum Information is the study of Information Theory based on the Principles of Quan-
tum Mechanics [1]. As such, it combines disciplines as Computer Science, Physics and
Mathematics. Quantum properties and interactions between systems are now taken into
consideration that were firstly noticed in the quantum world of microscopic particles. In
fact, these properties and interactions can provide with advancements to technological
fields such as quantum computation, communication and metrology. More specifically,
one of their contribution in terms of communication is the Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD).
Here, protocols describing the public exchange of (quantum) signals between tradition-
ally two or more authenticated parties and their post-processing can guaranty in principle,
based on the lows of Quantum Mechanics, the creation of a secret shared random data
string, called the key [2, 3]. This can be used later for message encryption based for
example on unconditionally secure processes such as the one-time pad primitive [4]. In
order such a primitive to work, the parties must have the same key, which is as large as
the message to be sent, exchanged in advance after a clandestine meeting. Every time
they should exchange a different key for a different message. Otherwise accumulation of
messages encrypted with the same key can reveal information about the key putting in
danger the security of the communication. This means that there is a need for a regu-
lar large-secret-key distribution mechanism using public channels to meet the demand of
the amount of telecommunication nowadays. One candidate for this mechanism is QKD.
Nowadays a popular way to treat the previous gap is the asymmetric encrypting schemes,
e.g. RSA protocol [5], that their security is based on the computational power of the
given eavesdropper, the potential adversary of the authenticated parties trying to reveal
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their secret key and overhear their communication. However, progress in computational
capability provided by, e.g., a Quantum computer, can threaten this kind of security.
Fortunately, apart from the first protocol introduced by Bennet and Brassard [6],
further progress has been made the last years towards not only theoretical studies but also
experimental implementations of QKD protocols. Here, we will focus on research mostly
done in a continuous-variables (CV) framework [7] in the sense of using the continuous
electromagnetic field degrees of freedom in contrast to the originally used discrete photon
degrees of freedom. This CV-QKD version [8] allows the use of common components
regarding current technology for being implemented with reasonable performances for
metropolitan network areas.
The central protocols encapsulating the basic ideas of CV-QKD are these using a
particular kind of quantum states of light, called coherent states (see Sec. 2.4.1.2), as
signals modulated by a Gaussian distribution [9–11]. For these protocols, we have also
security analyses incorporating finite-size effects [12,14,15]. In this case, their performance
is evaluated with respect to a given number of signal exchange in contrast to the initial step
of an asymptotic security analysis under the assumption of a very large, asymptotically
infinite, number of exchanged signals. This assumption implies a more realistic description
and evaluation of a given protocol closer to its performance in a practical implementation.
Moreover, it comprises an intermediate step for a security analysis under a composable
framework [16], where, for example, the overall security of a cryptographic task including a
QKD protocol can be assessed with respect to the latter’s security. Here, a given protocol
breaks down to smaller tasks that all contribute to its security. The result of each task
is evaluated with respect to a small parameter connected to the distance from the ideal
situation. In the end, these parameters sum up to a larger parameter associated with the
protocol’s security. Recently, in Ref. [17,18], proofs of composable security were presented
for the protocols with coherent states and Gaussian distribution taking into consideration
the most general (powerful) attacks.
A variation of the protocols described above is this of using a particular kind of quan-
tum states, called thermal states (see 2.4.1.1), as the noisy counterpart of the coherent
states mentioned above. This can be seen as an error in the preparation procedure of the
signal states. However, this trusted thermal noise [23] can be connected to the frequency
of the electromagnetic field and provide with schemes working in different regimes than
the optical one, for instance, schemes operating in microwaves. The asymptotic security
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of schemes using thermal states with Gaussian modulation was studied in Ref. [19–23] and
an experiment was done in Ref. [25]. In this thesis, and to the best of my knowledge, we
present for the first time a non-asymptotic security analysis of such a protocol using ther-
mal states (see Ref. [26]) by incorporating finite size effects based on the method provided
by Ref. [15].
In such QKD schemes, the two authenticated parties exchange signals publicly usually
through a telecommunication channel. Then we assume mainly that the eavesdropper has
the opportunity to interact with the signals as they travel from one user to another. But
in general, an attack is feasible to be made during the preparation or the detection of the
signals, namely a side-channel attack [3, 27, 28]. In this case, the detection attacks are
considered a more common practice for the eavesdropper. Nevertheless, protocols were
proposed in Ref. [29–31] that take into consideration countermeasures against side-channel
attacks on the detection process. These protocols are considered to be measurement
device independent (MDI) in the sense that the detection of the signals are made by
a third party (authenticated or not), i.e., an intermediate relay, and the outcomes are
broadcast. Due to the existence of the relay, such an end-to-end setting can be extended
to a network configuration as in Ref. [32,33]. In Ref. [34], we investigated the performance
of this protocol assuming finite-size effects based on an non-asymptotic security analysis as
previously. Furthermore, we participated in the work for providing a composable security
analysis for the CV-MDI-QKD (see Ref. [35, 36]).
Let us assume now, that the communication channel is not stable in the sense that
its ability to transmit (transmissivity) signals changes in time. This inconsistence follows
usually from some pattern which is described by a probability distribution. This phe-
nomenon is called the fading of the channel [37] and can have several implications on the
performance of the protocol. Usually, this comes into effect and has implications for a
given protocol when we assume free-space links [38] susceptible to environmental condi-
tions such as atmospheric turbulence [39–45]. In case that the changes are slow enough
so that the parties can estimate the fading distribution, the performance of the protocol
can be averaged out over it, as for example in Ref. [46]. There are cases though that
the channel is under the full control of the eavesdropper, who might have the ability to
change instantaneously the transmissivity of the link for every signal. This results in an
asymmetric situation for the users against the eavesdropper: the parties know the partic-
ular distribution only by the end of the signal exchange. We investigated this worst case
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scenario in Ref. [47] for the protocol with coherent states and Gaussian modulation, the
CV-MDI-QKD protocol in the symmetric configuration and its three-user star network
extension adopting a simple assumption of uniform fast fading channels. The simplicity
of the uniform distribution can be justified by the assumption of an adversary tampering
with the transmissivity of the channel in a mechanical way.
An alternative way for CV-QKD that keeps some properties of its discrete counterpart
is the use of a given number of coherent states, each one encoding a given letter in an
alphabet, instead of using a Gaussian distribution to modulate them. Such protocols have
an advantage on their performance compared with the fully continuous ones regarding
the existence of more efficient error correction codes for discrete variables [8]. Asymptotic
analysis has been provided for such protocols in Ref. [48]. We extended this analysis for
the case of a thermal loss channel without using a Gaussian approximation assumption.
This thesis is split into two parts. The first one is introducing the main concept of
CV-QKD and discusses the schemes and studies that I have been based on in order to be
able to contribute in the recent advances of CV-QKD. My contribution is presented in the
second part. So we start with the structure of the first part: In Chap. 2, we introduce
the quantum states of the electromagnetic field and their representation in phase space,
which justifies the term of continuous-variables. We also discuss matters such as their
evolution through channels and their detection as signals. Finally, we introduce quantities
that quantify the amount of information carried by such states. In Chap. 3, we introduce
the QKD with CV using as an example the the one-way protocols with coherent states
modulated by a Gaussian distribution. We also introduce their discrete counterpart, i.e.,
a protocol with an arbitrary number of phase-encoded coherent states. Afterwards, in
Chap. 4 and Chap. 5, we address the asymptotic analysis of the thermal state protocol
and the CV-MDI protocol respectively. And in the last chapter of this part (Chap. 6), we
present the efficient channel parameter estimation method incorporating finite-size effects
for the protocols using coherent states with Gaussian modulation.
The structure of the second part continues as follows: Based on this previous method
and by adapting it appropriately, we present an non-asymptotic security analysis for the
thermal state protocol and for the CV-MDI protocol in Chap. 7 and Chap. 8 respectively.
In Chap. 9, we discuss about a channel parameter estimation without assuming the cen-
tral limit theorem and explain how the non-assymptotic security analysis in a composable
framework functions for the case of the CV-MDI protocol. In Chap. 10, we investigate the
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fast fading channel assumption for protocols with coherent states, measurement-device in-
dependent protocol and a network star configuration for three-users. Finally, in Chap. 11,
we address the case of thermal loss channel for the arbitrary number phase-encoded co-
herent state protocol.
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Preliminaries
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Chapter 2
Continuous-variables states
2.1 Introduction
In current telecommunication, the electromagnetic field plays the central role of the signal
carrier. In this chapter, we will introduce its quantized counterpart summarized by the
bosonic systems, which can be associated with CV systems. In particular, we will present
the formalism of bosonic systems and the corresponding quantum states. Furthermore,
we are going to address their representation in the phase space, as it gives us insight in
our later discussion. In fact, the phase-space representation is directly connected with
the term CV. This representation is analogous to a classical system with its “position”
corresponding to the in-phase component of the field and its “momentum” corresponding
to the out-of phase component of the field. All the following concepts are described more
thoroughly in Ref. [1, 7, 8, 49].
2.2 Quantized electromagnetic field
In classical physics, the two fundamental quantities describing the electromagnetic field
are the electric filed E(r, t) and the magnetic field B(r, t), both functions of time t and
space r. The two fields are satisfying the Maxwell equations given by
∇×E = −∂B
∂t
, (2.1)
∇×B = 1
c2
∂E
∂t
, (2.2)
∇ ·E = 0, (2.3)
∇ ·B = 0, (2.4)
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for the empty space, i.e., vacuum, where the densities of currents and charges are zero
and c denotes the speed of light. The Maxwell equations interconnect the evolution of
these two fields resulting in a propagation of an electromagnetic wave. In fact, solving
these equations within an infinite square box, the field is decomposed into planar waves
or bosonic modes. A single mode of the field is a propagating wave with a given frequency
f = 2piω, propagation direction k and polarization z and its electric field can be expressed
as
E(r, t) = iEz [au(r)eiωt − c.c.], (2.5)
where E includes all the physical constants. The propagation in space is described by u(r)
whereas the evolution in time by eiωt. The complex conjugate term describes the reverse
propagation wave component in contrast to the propagation of the first term component in
the brackets. In classical electromagnetism the amplitude a is a complex number and a∗ is
its complex conjugate. A rigorous way to quantize the field is by replacing the amplitudes
in Eq. (2.5) with the mutually adjoint quantum operators aˆ and aˆ† respectively, which
follow the bosonic commutation relations
[aˆ, aˆ†] = 1, [aˆ, aˆ] = [aˆ†, aˆ†] = 0. (2.6)
As a result, the electric and magnetic field are now quantum operators denoted by Eˆ and
Bˆ. On that account, the energy of the mode is expressed by
Hˆ =
1
2
∫
ϵ0Eˆ
2 +
1
µ0
Bˆ2 dr, (2.7)
where µ0ϵ0 = c
−2, ϵ0 is the electric permittivity and µ0 is the magnetic permeability of
free space. Using Eq. (2.5) and natural units (h = 2), the energy simplifies to
Hˆ = 2nˆ+ 1, (2.8)
where nˆ = aˆaˆ†.
We can associate each isolated bosonic mode to a vector space H called Hilbert space,
where its unit vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H describe a given state ρˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ| of the mode, where 〈ψ|
stands for the Hermitian conjugate of |ψ〉.
Remark: For unit vectors |ψi〉 ∈ H for i = 1, 2, . . . , N we have that the unit vector
|ψ〉 =∑Ni=1 ci|ψi〉 ∈ H, where ∑Ni=1 |ci|2 = 1 and ci ∈ C .
A basis of H can be constructed by the number operator. To do so, one solves the
eigensystem
nˆ|n〉 = n|n〉, (2.9)
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where n = 0, 1, · · · +∞, and |n〉 are the eigenkets of nˆ. The eigenset {|n〉}∞n=0 forms an
orthonormal basis and spans a countable Hilbert space called the Fock space. It is called
the number state basis because each eigenket describes a state with exactly n energy
excitations of the system, i.e., photons. Nevertheless, as one can see, even if the mode has
no excitations, its energy is not zero. As a result, the state without excitations is called
the vacuum and its energy is called the vacuum shot noise which we assume to be equal
to 1. Moreover, the operators aˆ and aˆ† are called the ladder operators and their action in
the number state basis is given by
aˆ|0〉 = 0, aˆ|n〉 = √n|n− 1〉 (for n ≥ 1), (2.10)
aˆ†|n〉 = √n+ 1|n+ 1〉 (for n ≥ 0). (2.11)
A bosonic system is a system that consist of N quantized radiation field modes, i.e.,
bosonic modes, corresponding to N quantum harmonic oscillators. A bosonic state then
is associated with a Hilbert space H⊗N = ⊗Ni=1Hi equal to the tensor product of N
bosonic mode Hilbert spaces Hi. Accordingly, one can express the ladder operator of a
given bosonic system with respect to the ladder operators of its modes in a vectorial form
as cˆ := (aˆ1, aˆ
†
1 . . . aˆN , aˆ
†
N ). As a result, the bosonic commutation relations for cˆ, by virtue
of the symplectic form
ω :=
 0 1
−1 0
 (2.12)
are expressed as
[cˆi, cˆ
†
j ] = Ωij (i, j = 1, . . . , 2N), Ω :=
N⊕
k=1
ω. (2.13)
A state of M isolated systems each one consisting of Ni modes i = 1, 2, . . . ,M is
described by a tensor product of states
|φ〉〈φ| = |φ1〉〈φ1| ⊗ |φ2〉〈φ2| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φM 〉〈φM |, (2.14)
where |φi〉〈φi| are the states of each isolated system. Let us assume that there is an
ensemble of systems each one found in a state |φi〉〈φi| for i = 1, 2, . . . , L with a probability
pi. Then the average state of this ensemble will be given by
ρˆ =
L∑
i=1
pi|φi〉〈φi|, (2.15)
where
∑L
i=1 pi = 1 and are called mixed states in contrast with the pure states defined
as the states that can be associated with vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H. The mixed states encapsulate
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the notion of classical randomness associated with not knowing the initial conditions of a
process. On the contrary, quantum randomness or uncertainty that is an intrinsic property
of a quantum system is described by the principle of superposition (see remark in Sec. 2.2).
Now consider a system consisting of two subsystems A and B. The state of the
composite system is ρˆAB while the state ρˆA of subsystem A is given by the partial trace
of ρˆAB over the the subsystem B expressed as
ρˆA = TrB ρˆAB. (2.16)
and its action is given in the following definition.
Definition 2.2.1 The partial trace operation is the linear operation that for any two
vectors |a1〉, |a2〉 in the states space of A and any two vectors |b1〉, |b2〉 in the state space
of B is defined as follows
TrB(|a1〉〈a2| ⊗ |b1〉〈b2|) := |a1〉〈a2|Tr(|b1〉〈b2|) = |a1〉〈a2|〈b2|b1〉. (2.17)
We can see that for a composite system in a pure state described by a superposition
of states
ρˆAB =
L∑
i=1
ci|ai〉|bi〉
L∑
j=1
c∗j 〈aj |〈bj | =
L∑
i,j=1
cic
∗
j |ai〉〈aj | ⊗ |bi〉〈bj |, (2.18)
where 〈bi|bj〉 = δij and
∑L
i=1 |ci|2 = 1, the partial trace operation over B will be given by
ρˆB = TrB ρˆAB =
L∑
i=1
|ci|2|ai〉〈ai| (2.19)
which is a mixed state. In fact quantum mechanical systems have the property according
to which the exact knowledge of a system’s state (pure state) does not reflect the exact
knowledge about its subsystems state (mixed states).
2.3 Phase-space representation
At this point, one associates a 2-dimensional vector space, namely the phase-space K,
spanned by the quadratures q and p of a given bosonic mode with a Hilbert space H.
These are the continuous eigenvalues q, p ∈ R of the quadrature operators qˆ and pˆ and are
defined as
qˆ|q〉 = q|q〉 and pˆ|p〉 = p|p〉, (2.20)
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where the eigenkets are connected by
|q〉 = 1
2
√
pi
∫
dp e−iqp/2 and |p〉 = 1
2
√
pi
∫
dq eiqp/2. (2.21)
The states |q〉 and |p〉 lie outside the Hilbert space of the system since they are not
normalizable. Nevertheless, they form an orthogonal set. In particular, one has
〈q|q′〉 = δ(q − q′) and 〈p|p′〉 = δ(p− p′), (2.22)
where δ stands for the Dirac-delta function. The quadrature eigenstates form a basis for
the Hilbert space H in the sense that for any given |φ〉 ∈ H exists its decomposition in
the position basis {|q〉} given by |φ〉 = ∫ dqφ(q)|q〉, where φ(q) = 〈q|φ〉 is called the wave
function of the position for the state |φ〉. Analogously, one can proceed for |p〉. The
relation between the quadrature operators and the ladder operators are given by
qˆ = aˆ+ aˆ† and pˆ = i(aˆ† − aˆ), (2.23)
resulting in the canonical commutation relation
[qˆ, pˆ] = 2i. (2.24)
In phase space, a classical state of a mode, where its electric field is described by
Eq. (2.5), corresponds to a single point x = (q, p)T . From an intuitive point of view, the
quantum description of the field is the extension of the classical one, where due to the
introduction of quantum noise, a manifestation of Heisenberg’s principle, the single point
is exchanged with a continuum set of points taken with different probabilities. Before
defining more rigorously this probability formulation, one introduces the vectorial form of
the quadrature operators for a bosonic system of N modes. In that event, the quadrature
operators are arranged in the vectorial form as
xˆ := (qˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , qˆN , pˆN )
T , (2.25)
where the canonical commutation relations in natural units (h = 2) are given by
[xˆi, xˆj ] = 2iΩij (2.26)
derived by Eq. (2.13). Subsequently, one has that
xˆT |x〉 = xT |x〉 (2.27)
with x ∈ R2N and |x〉 := (|x1〉, . . . , |x2N 〉).
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For any bosonic state ρˆ, there is an equivalent representation in terms of a quasi-
probability distribution called Wigner function over the CV x ∈ R2N , eigenvalues of the
quadrature operators xˆ, which span a real symplectic space K := (R2N ,Ω), i.e., the phase
space. In order to introduce this representation, one needs first to introduce the Weyl
operator
D(ξ) := exp
(
ixˆTΩξ
)
, ξ ∈ R2N . (2.28)
Then the Wigner characteristic function will have the following form
χ(ξ) = Tr[ρˆD(ξ)], (2.29)
where by using its Fourier transform one obtains
W (x) =
1
(2pi)2N
∫
R2N
d2Nξ exp
(−ixTΩξ)χ(ξ). (2.30)
This is the Wigner function which is normalized to 1 but it can be negative thus charac-
terized as a quasi-probability distribution.
As a quasi-probability distribution, a Wigner function is fully characterized by its
statistical moments. The first statistical moment corresponding to the mean x¯ is the
displacement vector
x¯ := 〈xˆ〉 = Tr[xˆρˆ]. (2.31)
The second moment is called the covariance matrix (CM) V with elements
Vij :=
1
2
〈{∆xˆi,∆xˆj}〉, ∆xˆi = xˆi − 〈xˆi〉, (2.32)
where {, } is the anti-commutator. Using the CM of Eq. (2.32) and the commutation
relations in Eq. (2.26), one can express the uncertainty principle as
V + iΩ ≥ 0, (2.33)
which implies that V > 0, i.e., is a positive definite matrix. The Wigner function may be
used to represent the quantum state of a mode. In particular, its contour depicts the set
of the most probable points in the phase space and provides us with an intuitive picture
especially suitable for quantum states with a Gaussian Wigner function.
With the phase-space representation, we exploit the quantum mechanical nature of
light keeping the same approach as in the classical regime, i.e., describing it as a field
or wave and not as particles. This allows us to use it as a carrier for (quantum) signals
encoded on its modulated intensity (energy) exploiting the current technology designed
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for the classical electromagnetic field. In addition to this, the mathematical tools based
on this description provide us with a concise and intuitive way to describe the quantum
states of light via the Wigner function, where their description with CV becomes evident.
As we will see later, another important tool studied in this chapter is the CM. In fact,
the states with Gaussian Wigner functions are described only by their first two statistical
moments, in the sense that all the information for them are included in their mean and
CM.
2.4 Gaussian states
Gaussian states are bosonic states having a Wigner representation which is a Gaussian.
Their characteristic function has the following form
χ(x) = exp
(
−1
2
ξT (ΩVΩT )ξ − i(Ωx¯)T ξ
)
(2.34)
and their Wigner function is given by
W (x) =
1
(2pi)N
√
DetV
exp
(−(1/2)(x− x¯)TV−1(x− x¯)) . (2.35)
One of their significant properties is that both the states and their dynamics are completely
characterized by the two first moments x¯ and V. In fact, one is able to express a given
Gaussian state as
ρˆG = ρˆ(x¯,V). (2.36)
Remarks:
a) For a global Gaussian state
ρˆGglobal(0,Vglobal) =
N⊗
i=1
ρˆi(0,Vi)
holds that Vglobal =
⊕N
i=1Vi.
b) The mean value x¯ can always be configured by local operations on each mode (e.g.,
displacements defined given in Eq. (2.44), which are not affecting the inter-mode
correlations of the CM.
In order to be able to study the Gaussian states and their properties, we study here
the Gaussian transformations as a way to describe mathematically how a given Gaussian
state can be derived from another one. This is necessary to our later discussion so as to
identify connections between Gaussian states which form specific classes.
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2.4.0.1 Gaussian unitary operators and symplectic transformations
For the reversible transformation of a state ρˆ, e.g., time evolution, there are trace pre-
serving unitary quantum operations called unitary quantum channels. A general rule for
such a transformation is ρˆ → Uˆ ρˆUˆ †, where the transformation is represented by the uni-
tary matrix Uˆ . When Uˆ transforms a Gaussian state to another Gaussian state, then is
called a Gaussian channel. These unitary operators can be obtained from a second order
Hamiltonian Hˆ on the field operators, where a general form can be written as follows
Hˆ = i(aˆ†α+ aˆ†Faˆ+ aˆ†Gaˆ†T ) + H.c., (2.37)
where α ∈ CN , F and G are N × N complex matrices, and H.c. stands for Hermitian
conjugate. Accordingly, the unitary operator will have the following form
Uˆ = exp
(
−iHˆ/2
)
. (2.38)
On the other hand, in the Heisenberg picture, this kind of unitary corresponds to a linear
unitary Bogoliubov transformation
aˆ→ Uˆ †aˆUˆ = Aaˆ+Baˆ† + α (2.39)
where the N ×N complex matrices A and B satisfy ABT = BAT and AA† = BB† + I.
In terms of the quadrature operators, they are described by affine maps such
(S,d) : xˆ→ Sxˆ+ d (2.40)
where d ∈ R2N and S is a 2N×2N real matrix. For such a transformation to preserve the
commutation relations in Eq. (2.26), it is required that SΩST = Ω, namely S to be sym-
plectic. Finally, the action of such operations to the statistical moments are summarized
by the following relations
x¯→ Sx¯+ d and V→ SVST . (2.41)
2.4.1 Examples of Gaussian states
In this section, we present the most common classes of Gaussian states with respect to
our research and they are usually connected to specific Gaussian unitary transformations.
These states are not only useful in the sense of providing theoretical intuition but also can
be produced efficiently in an experimental setting using the current technology.
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2.4.1.1 Vacuum and thermal states
The vacuum state is the eigenstate of the annihilation operator with zero eigenvalue, i.e.,
aˆ|0〉 = 0, while its CM is the identity matrix. This state is characterized by the fact that
both the quadratures reach symmetrically the minimum variance according to Heisenberg’s
principle. This variance, intrinsic in the theory of quantum mechanics and manifested in
Heisenberg’s principle, can be seen from an information theoretic point of view as noise
induced by nature, thus is called quantum shot noise.
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Figure 2.1: A vacuum state |0〉 is associated with a circle of unit radius (quantum shot noise)
centred in the origin (zero mean). We can obtain a coherent states |a〉 after applying a displacement
operator Dˆ(a) which changes only the first moment of the vacuum state to x¯ = (Re[a], Im[a]). A
thermal state is associated with a circle with variance 2n¯+1 larger than the shot noise (gray circle)
centred in the origin.
The vacuum state is a special case of Gaussian states, called thermal states and their
phase space contour is depicted in Fig. 2.1. These states have the same variance for both
quadratures and maximize the von Neumann entropy (see Eq.(2.77)) for a fixed amount
of energy n¯ = Tr[ρˆaˆ†aˆ] which corresponds to the average number of photons, i.e., bosonic
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excitations. In particular, its representation with number-states is given by
ρˆ(n¯) =
+∞∑
n=0
n¯n
(n¯+ 1)n+1
|n〉〈n|. (2.42)
while its CM is
V = (2n¯+ 1)I. (2.43)
2.4.1.2 Coherent states
In order to study the second class of states, one needs first to define the displacement
operator a complex version of the Weyl operator introduced in Eq. (2.28).
Definition 2.4.1 The displacement operator is given by
D(a) := exp
(
aaˆ† − a∗aˆ
)
, (2.44)
where a = (q + ip)/2 is the complex amplitude and transforms the quadrature operators
as xˆ→ xˆ+ da, where da = (q, p)T .
The displacement operator takes its name by the fact that its action on the vacuum,
illustrated in Fig. 2.1, creates a state |a〉 = D(a)|0〉 that is an eigenstate of the annihilator
operator aˆ|a〉 = a|a〉. Such states are called coherent states, they have the same CM with
the vacuum, while their mean value is x¯ = da. Moreover, the square of the absolute value
of the amplitude a is equal with the mean number of photons of the state, i.e., |a|2 = n¯,
and for n¯→∞ the given mode is describing a classical electromagnetic field. The number
state representation of a coherent state is given by
|a〉 = exp
(
−1
2
|a|2
) ∞∑
n=0
a2√
(n!)
|n〉. (2.45)
On that account, for a given pair of coherent states |a〉,|b〉 there is an overlap given by
|〈a|b〉|2 = exp (−|b− a|2) . (2.46)
Thus, the class of the coherent states form an over-complete basis being non-orthogonal.
2.4.1.3 Squeezed states
It is first helpful to describe the squeezed states through another unitary transformation
represented by the squeezing operator.
40
2.4 Gaussian states
Definition 2.4.2 The one mode squeezing operator is defined as
S(r) := exp
(
r(aˆ2 − (aˆ†)2)/2
)
, (2.47)
for squeezing parameter r ∈ R and transforms the quadrature operators as
xˆ→ S(r)xˆ, S(r) :=
e−r 0
0 er
 . (2.48)
A squeezed state is generated by applying this operator to the vacuum and its number
state representation is
|0, r〉 = 1√
cosh r
∞∑
n=0
√
(2n)!
2nn!
tanh rn|2n〉. (2.49)
As depicted in Fig. 2.2, the one mode squeezing operator shrinks the quantum noise in
quadrature qˆ for r < 0, whereas for r > 0 shrinks the noise in quadrature pˆ. Furthermore,
in the limit of infinite squeezing, namely r → ∞, the realized states are the asymptotic
quadrature eigenstates, i.e., the states in Eq. (2.20) for q = 0 and p = 0 respectively.
What is more, its CM is given by V = S(r)S(r)T = S(2r), for which one quadrature
noise variance is below the quantum shot noise while the other is anti-squeezed above it.
A general squeezed state is realized by applying the displacement operator to a squeezed
vacuum state depicted in Fig. 2.2. The final state has the same CM while its mean value
will be x¯ = (q, p) given by the amplitude of the displacement a = (q + ip)/2.
2.4.1.4 Rotated states
One more unitary operation is needed before one is able to study a general formula for a
one-mode Gaussian state. This element is called the phase rotation operator.
Definition 2.4.3 The rotation operator, for a proper rotation with angle θ, is defined as
R(θ) = exp
(−iaˆ†aˆ) and transforms the quadratures as
xˆ→ R(θ)xˆ, R(θ) =
 cosθ sinθ
−sinθ cosθ
 . (2.50)
By using the singular value decomposition, any 2 × 2 matrix can be decomposed as S =
R(θ)S(r)R(φ). Therefore, any Gaussian state can be described by a mean value x¯ = d
and a CM V = (2n¯ + 1)R(θ)S(2r)R(φ). For n¯ = 0, this CM describes the most general
one-mode pure Gaussian state corresponding to a rotated, squeezed and displaced vacuum
state |a, θ, r〉 = D(a)R(θ)S(r)|0〉.
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Figure 2.2: A vertical ellipse is associated with a p-quadrature squeezed state |0, r < 0〉 and a hor-
izontal with a q-quadrature squeezed state |0, r > 0〉 respectively. The displacement operator D(a)
is acting on a squeezed state affecting only its first moment witch finally goes to x¯ = (Re[a], Im[a]).
For comparison, the vacuum state is presented here with a circle of unit radius (dashed circle).
2.4.1.5 Two-mode squeezed vacuum states
A two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state describes a two-mode entangled sate. In
order to describe the creation of a TMSV state, one has to study the following two-mode
operation.
Definition 2.4.4 For the annihilation operators aˆ and bˆ of two modes the two-mode
squeezing operator is defined as
S2(r) = exp
(
r(aˆbˆ− aˆ†bˆ†)/2
)
(2.51)
for the two-mode squeezing parameter r while the quadrature operator xˆ := (qˆa, pˆa, qˆb, pˆb)
is transformed as
xˆ→ S2(r)xˆ, S2(r) :=
coshrI sinhrZ
sinhrZ coshrI
 (2.52)
and Z = diag(1,−1).
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By applying S2(r) to a pair of modes A and B in vacuum states,
|ν〉TMSV = Sˆ2(r) (|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B)
one obtains
ρˆTMSV = |ν〉〈ν|TMSV, |ν〉TMSV =
√
1− λ2
∞∑
n=0
(−λ)n|n〉A|n〉B, (2.53)
with λ = tanh r ∈ [0, 1] and ν = cosh 2r. The CM of this state is
VTMSV(ν) :=
 νI √ν2 − 1Z√
ν2 − 1Z νI
 . (2.54)
An TMSV state is characterized by its maximal correlations between the two modes.
These correlations, which are increasing with ν represent a typical form of entanglement.
For ν = 1, one obtains VTMSV(1) = I⊕ I, which corresponds to the tensor product of two
vacuum states ρˆTMSV = |0〉〈0|A⊗ |0〉〈0|A. Therefore, the TMSV state is separable only in
this case, whereas for ν →∞ the state becomes an ideal Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
state with maximal correlations, namely qˆA → qˆB and pˆA → −pˆB. In other words, the
positions of the two modes become correlated and the momenta become anti-correlated.
An important observation is that the reduced states of TMSV states, i.e.,
ρˆA = TrB (ρˆTMSV) and ρˆB = TrA (ρˆTMSV)
are two identical thermal states ρˆA = ρˆB = ρˆth(ν) with CM equal to νI, where ν = 2n¯+1
quantifies the mean thermal photon number in each mode.
2.4.2 Symplectic decomposition
An important property of the CM of a Gaussian state is their connection with special
diagonal matrices. According to Williamson’s theorem (see Ref. [8]), there is a symplectic
transformation for every positive-definite real matrix of even dimension that can transform
the given matrix to its diagonal form. By applying this to an N -mode CM V, one obtains
that
V = SV⊕ST , V⊕ :=
N⊕
k=1
νkI (2.55)
The diagonal matrix V⊕ is called the Williamson form of V and the quantities νk are its
symplectic eigenvalues.
Remarks:
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a) The above property provides an equivalent way to express the uncertainty principle
of Eq. (2.33) as
V ≥ 0, V⊕ ≥ I. (2.56)
This can be stated differently by saying that a CM must be positive definite and its
symplectic eigenvalues must satisfy νk ≥ 1.
b) According to Eq. (2.43), V⊕ corresponds to the CM of a product state of N thermal
modes where their variances are given by the symplectic eigen-spectrum of V. For
example, the Williamson’s form
V⊕ =
N⊕
i=1
νiI (2.57)
of an N -mode CM is associated with the Gaussian state
ρˆ(0,V⊕) =
N⊗
i=1
ρˆth(νi). (2.58)
In that event, one notices that an arbitrary Gaussian state can be decomposed, up
to a unitary UˆS,d = Dˆ(d)UˆS , into a tensor product of thermal states as
ρˆ(d,V) = UˆS,dρˆ(0,V
⊕)Uˆ †S,d. (2.59)
2.5 Measurement and evolution of Gaussian states
In this section, we are concerned with basically two concepts which are the detection and
the evolution of bosonic states. Firstly, we present the concept of evolution of a Gaus-
sian state, e.g., through a communication channel, described by the action of Gaussian
channels. Afterwards we present the homodyne and heterodyne measurement of a bosonic
mode, since they are the main detections applied in our study dictated by the fact that
are commonly used in the current technological implementations.
2.5.1 Gaussian channels
At this point and in order to facilitate the following discussion we present the notion of
purification, where a given an arbitrary state ρˆA can be mapped to a pure state of a larger
system ρˆRA.
Definition 2.5.1 A purification of a density operator with spectral decomposition ρˆA =∑
x pX(x) |x〉A〈x| ∈ D(HA) is a pure bipartite state |ψ〉RA on a reference system A, with
the property that the reduced state on system A is equal to ρˆA = TrR|ψ〉RA〈ψ|.
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Figure 2.3: This is the dilation of the channel E for an input state ρˆ and environment state ρˆE
under the global unitary evolution U with output ρˆ′ = E(ρˆ). If ρˆE = |Φ〉E〈Φ| is a pure state then
the dilation is called Stinespring dilation.
In that regard, the evolution denoted by a channel E of an arbitrary state can be
described as a unitary evolution of a larger pure system as illustrated in Fig. 2.3. This
is called the dilation of the channel, named after the expansion of the Hilbert space used
to describe the system of interest as part of a larger pure system. More specifically, a
N -mode Gaussian channel for an arbitrary state ρˆ ∈ D(H⊗) is a completely positive and
trace preserving linear map EG : ρˆ → EG(ρˆ) ∈ D(H⊗). A way to represent such a map
is by a Gaussian unitary operation acting on a larger system part of which is the input
state ρˆ. The rest of the system which is called the environment E is found in a multi-
mode Gaussian pure state |Φ〉E and without loss of generality in a multi-mode vacuum
|Φ〉E=|0〉E . Then the output of the channel is given after tracing out the environment,
namely
E(ρˆ) = TrE
(
U(ρˆ× |Φ〉E〈Φ|)U †
)
. (2.60)
With regard to the first and second statistical moments, the action of the channel can be
expressed as
x¯→ Tx¯+ d, V→ TVT+N, (2.61)
where d ∈ R2N is a displacement vector, while T and N = NT are 2N × 2N real matrices
satisfying the complete positivity condition
N+ iΩ− iTΩTT ≥ 0. (2.62)
The correspondence to the Gaussian unitary operators is obtained by setting T := S to be
symplectic and N = 0. For a one-mode channel, setting N = 1, one derive the following
relations
N = NT ≥ 0, detN ≥ (detT− 1)2. (2.63)
According to the following definition, a Gaussian channel can be decomposed to a
simpler form called the canonical form.
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Figure 2.4: Here is the Stinespring dilation of a channel unique up to partial isometries U˜ . Due
to this fact, the environment can be expressed as an ensemble of modes {E, e}, where the modes in
e are found in vacuum states. Furthermore, this channel is expressed through its canonical form C
with U and W the input and output modes respectively. The canonical form is further reduced to
a three-mode Gaussian unitary operator L acting on the input mode and to a two-mode squeezed
vacuum state |ν〉〈ν|.
Definition 2.5.2 A Gaussian channel G(d,T,N) can always be decomposed as
G(ρˆ) =W [C(UρˆU †)]W † (2.64)
where W , U are the output-input Gaussian unitary operators. Then C = C(dc;Tc;Nc) is
called the canonical form and is a Gaussian channel with dc = 0 and Tc, Nc diagonal.
The explicit expression of the Tc and Nc depend on three quantities that are preserved
by the action of the Gaussian unitary operators. These are the generalized transmittance
τ := detT(−∞ < τ < ∞), the rank r := [rank(T)rank(N)]/2(for r = 0, 1, 2) and the
temperature n¯ a non-negative number defined by
n¯ :=

(detN)1/2 for τ = 1
(detN)1/2
|1−τ | − 12 for τ ̸= 1.
(2.65)
2.5.1.1 Thermal-loss channel
The canonical form of a given one-mode channel can be further simplified through its
Stinespring dilation. In particular, a generic C is transformed to a three-mode Gaussian
unitary operator UL corresponding to the symplectic transformation L = L(τ, r), which
mixes the input mode with an TMSV state |ν〉〈ν|TMSV with thermal variance ν = 2n¯+1.
So for any canonical form of an one-mode Gaussian channel, one can assign the pair
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{L(τ, r), |ν〉〈ν|TMSV} as illustrated in Fig. 2.4. By setting r = 2 and 0 < τ < 1, one can
study a special case of one-mode Gaussian channel describing the evolution of a Gaussian
state across a communication channel, such as an optical fiber, between two parties. This
channel is called the thermal-loss channel and is defined as L(τ, r) := C(0 < τ < 1, 2, n¯).
It simulates the attenuation of the input signals and their combination with thermal noise
according to xˆ→ √τ xˆ+√1− τ xˆth, where xˆth is in a thermal state with n¯ mean number of
photons, which is the reduced state of σˆE = |ν|〉〈ν|. For expressing this channel, one can
define a unitary Gaussian operation describing the interaction between the two modes.
Definition 2.5.3 Let us assume two modes with ladder operators aˆ and bˆ and τ = cos2θ
is the transitivity of the beam splitter for θ ∈ [0, pi/2]. For τ = 1/2, the beam splitter is
called balanced. Then the transformation is defined as
B(θ) = exp
(
θ(aˆ†bˆ− aˆbˆ†)
)
(2.66)
and the quadrature operators xˆ := (qˆa, pˆa, qˆb, pˆb) are transformed as
xˆ→ B(τ)xˆ, B(τ) :=
 √τI √1− τI
−√1− τI √τI
 . (2.67)
By virtue of the beam splitter operation, one obtains the following relation
L(ρˆ) = TrE
(
UL(ρˆ⊗ σˆE)U †L
)
, (2.68)
where UL = B(θ)⊗ I.
A communications scenario can be described by two parties wanting to communicate
secretly against a third party who tampers with the channel, namely the eavesdropper. In
that event, an entangling cloner can simulate the third party’s strategy which consist of
two main stages. Firstly, the eavesdropper creates two copies of the signal from the sender.
Then resends one copy to the receiver using a channel with the same transmittance τ , while
keeps the other output of the beam splitter for a measurement. This can be modeled using
the previous description (see also Ref. [61]). Eve has two modes in a TMSV state, which is
used as a source of thermal noise attributed only to Eve and known by her. One of these
modes (a thermal state) interacts with Alice’s input mode via a beam splitter operation
with transmissivity g = 1− τ then it travels to Bob. Alice’s mode is kept to be measured
along with the remaining mode which is used as reference for the injected noise. Eve can
now estimate Bob’s arriving mode. In other words, by this description Eve purifies the
channel giving her the advantage to acquire all the information lost by Alice and Bob’s
system during the channel propagation.
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2.5.2 Measuring Gaussian states
2.5.2.1 Homodyne detection
This detection is the most common Gaussian detection measuring the quadrature qˆ or pˆ of
a given mode. The measurement operators describing this measurement are the projectors
of the quadrature basis, namely the infinite squeezed states |q〉〈q| or |p〉〈p| respectively.
The outcome of such a measurement is given by a probability distribution
P (q) =
∫
W (q, p)dp or P (p) =
∫
W (q, p)dq, (2.69)
which is the marginal probability of the Wigner function of the state over the conjugate
quadrature.
For a multi-mode state, the partial homodyne measurement, e.g., measuring only one
quadrature of one mode, can be realized by integrating over both quadratures of the
non-measured modes. In fact, the CM
V =
 A C
CT B
 . (2.70)
of a N+1-mode state comprised of two subsystems, A with N modes and B with 1 mode,
is transformed as
V˜ = A−C(ΠBΠ)−1CT (2.71)
where A is the CM of subsystem A and B is the CM of subsystem B. Matrix C describes
the correlations between system A and B. Moreover, Π is equal to Πq = diag(1, 0) or
Πp = diag(0, 1) for measuring qˆ or pˆ respectively. The power in −1 denotes here the
pseudo-inverse of the matrix included in the parenthesis.
2.5.2.2 Heterodyne detection
Another basic measurement is the heterodyne detection, which is the measurement of
both quadratures of a mode. In theory, this measurements corresponds to a projection
on coherent states, namely E(a) := pi−1/2|a〉a. This is accomplished by combining the
measured mode with an ancillary vacuum mode through a balanced beam splitter and
then homodyne each of the outputs with respect to different quadratures. Accordingly,
the output CM after a partial heterodyne detection is
V˜ = A−C(B+ I)−1CT (2.72)
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Remark:A generalized technique for modelling any partial Gaussian measurement is im-
plemented by appending ancillary modes to the original system, applying a Gaussian uni-
tary, part of the modes are being homodyned, another part is discarded. The remaining
part is the output system.
2.5.2.3 Bell detection
A Bell detection is a detection applied to two modes. Here two modes are mixed in a
balanced beam splitter and then each of its outputs is detected with respect to a conjugate
homodyne detection. This measurement is applied by the relay of Chap. 9.
2.6 Entropy and symplectic decomposition
In our later discussion, we are going to use quantum continuous-variable systems in order to
encode information. The notion of information describes the knowledge that the receiver
of a message acquires once he decodes it or the ignorance before doing so. Messages
which have high probability to occur, contain almost no information. On the other hand,
messages that are rare to be received maximize the amount of information.
In order to express more rigorously the previous discussion, let us consider a source
emitting signals over an alphabet with a certain probability. A stochastic variable X =
{p(x), x} is associated to that source and takes its values from a set X , i.e., the alphabet,
with a given probability distribution p(x). Accordingly, the the Shannon entropy of the
source is expressed as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x)log2p(x). (2.73)
If the variable x is continuous, the sum corresponds to an integral 1 over the probability
density derived from the distribution p(x). Subsequently, one can define the conditional
entropy [50] of two stochastic variables X and Y between two stochastic variables as
follows.
Definition 2.6.1 For two variables (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y), the conditional entropy H(Y |X) is
defined as
H(X|Y ) =
∑
x∈X
p(x)H(Y |X = x) (2.74)
1The corresponding quantity is called differential entropy. Although it has differences from the entropy
defined in Eq. (2.73), they are not affecting the definition of mutual information presented later.
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where H(Y |X = x) = −∑y∈Y p(y|x)log2p(y|x) and p(y|x) = p(x,y)p(x) .
This allows us to define another important quantity that accounts for the information
known for a variable Y given that we know variable X.
Definition 2.6.2 The mutual information between two stochastic variables Y and X is
defined as
I(Y : X) = H(Y )−H(Y |X). (2.75)
Remark: For Gaussian stochastic variables (see Theorem 4.3.1 in Ref [51]), this turns to
be equal to
I(Y : X) =
1
2
log2
VY
VY |X
, (2.76)
where VY and VY |X are the variances of the probability distribution Y and conditional
probability distribution of Y |X.
On the other hand, due to Heisenberg’s principle, quantum mechanics describe states
that have intrinsic uncertainty that can be quantified by the von Neumann entropy [1].
Definition 2.6.3 The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state is defined as
S(ρˆ) = −Tr (ρˆlog2ρˆ) = −
∑
x
λxlogλx (2.77)
for λx being the eigenvalues of ρˆ.
Remarks:
a) A thermal state ρˆth(n¯) is defined as the state that maximizes the von Neumann
entropy for a given mean number of energy excitations, namely photons.
b) According to the Schmidt decomposition [1], the local spectra of the two reduced
density matrices ρˆA and ρˆB of a global pure state ρAB are equal, namely {λAx } = {λBx }
resulting in S(ρˆA) = S(ρˆB).
c) A pure state has zero von Neumann entropy
At this point, we will focus on the entropic properties of Gaussian states, which will
be the main carrier of signals in our following discussion about secret key distribution. In
particular, their entropic analysis can be calculated effectively due to the fact that their
description is complete with only their first two moments. In fact, it turns out that the von
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Neumann entropy of a Gaussian state can be expressed by the corresponding symplectic
eigen-spectrum of its CM
S(ρˆ) =
N∑
k=1
h(νk), (2.78)
where the νk have been defined in Eq. (2.55) and
h(x) :=
(
x+ 1
2
)
log2
(
x+ 1
2
)
−
(
x− 1
2
)
log2
(
x− 1
2
)
. (2.79)
The von Neumann entropy is invariant under unitary evolution because is dependent only
on the eigenvalues of a given state (see Eq. (2.77)). Thus the entropy of a state ρˆ(d,V) is
the same with the entropy of the corresponding state ρˆ(0,V⊕). According to Eq. (2.57),
the entropy of the latter is given as the sum of each of the thermal states in the tensor
product [1].
Remark:According to the Stinespring dilation of a Gaussian channel, e.g. the thermal
loss channel, the output state of its environment is given by the the modes E that inter-
acted with a Gaussian travelling state plus the ancillary modes e, which without loss of
generality can be assumed as a tensor product of pure vacuum states, altogether evolved
by the unitary operator U˜ (see Fig. 2.4). From the discussion above, we notice that the
von Neumann entropy is not dependent on U˜ and also that the systems in e are not giv-
ing any contribution to it. Thus the only relevant modes for the calculation of the von
Neuman entropy of the environment are the interacting ones.
From equation Eq. (2.42) and the definition of the von Neuman entropy we can calcu-
late the von Neumann entropy Sth of a thermal state with n¯ mean photon number
Sth = −
∞∑
n=0
n¯n
(n¯+ 1)n+1
log2
n¯n
(n¯+ 1)n+1
(2.80)
where by using the series
∑∞
n=0 r
n = 11−r and
∑∞
n=0 nr
n = r
(r−1)2 for |r| < 1 we obtain
Eq. (2.79) for x = 2n¯+ 1. The later function, for large x≫ 1 is reduced to
h∞(x) = log2(
e
2
x) +O(
1
x
). (2.81)
Based on the von Neumann entropy, we define another quantity that describes the
maximum (classical) accessible information from a source that emits quantum states as
signals parametrized by a stochastic variable a, i.e., a quantum ensemble A = {ρˆa, pa}
with a mean state ρˆA =
∑
a paρˆa.
Definition 2.6.4 For a quantum source A the Holevo information is defined as
χ(A : a) = S(ρˆA)−
∑
a
paS(ρˆa). (2.82)
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Remarks: a) This quantity can be interpreted as the amount of information that someone
has over the variable a given that he has access to system A. b) Let us assume now that
the the state ρˆa is a Gaussian state and that its CM is independent on a, for example
a characterizes the displacement of the state in the phase space. Since its von Neumann
entropy is dependent only on the CM the sum in the above equation will reduce to S(ρˆa)
the von Neumann entropy of only one of the states of the ensemble. c) The discussion
in the remark after Eq. (2.78) holds also for the Holevo information inherited by the von
Neumann entropy.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on the electromagnetic field and on its quantum states. We also
discussed about their evolution. These states accept a CV description when we represent
them in the phase space. In particular, the Gaussian members of the bosonic quantum
states are good candidates for signal sources in quantum technological implementation,
such as QKD, as we will see in the next chapter. This advantage stems from the fact that
they are easy to produce in a lab, demand the same telecommunications infrastructure as
the classical electromagnetic field and at the same time acquire the key quantum properties
for the aforementioned applications. In the next chapter, we will explore this key quan-
tum properties and present quantum key distribution protocols using continuous-variables
states. These protocols are basic in the sense that they belong to the first CV-QKD
protocols showing that quantum key distribution can be implemented in this framework.
Moreover, other protocols discussed in this thesis can be seen as variations of them.
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Quantum key distribution with
continuous-variables
3.1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography utilizes the properties of quantum states, i.e., generally non-
orthogonal ones, in order to secure communication between two parties, named conven-
tionally Alice and Bob. In particular, Alice and Bob create a shared random secret key
that can use along with a symmetric cryptographic protocol such as the one-time pad.
To do so, Alice encodes her random variable in quantum states and sends them to Bob
through a communication (quantum) channel (see for example Eq. (2.60)). By measur-
ing these signals (decoding), Bob receives a random variable that is correlated to Alice.
Then they apply classical post processing procedures to their variables such as parameter
estimation, error correction and privacy amplification procedures [2, 3].
The security of such a quantum information protocol for key distribution is based on
the fact that quantum states in general cannot be perfectly copied, i.e., additional noise will
be added during the procedure of cloning. This is due to a manifestation of the Heisenberg
principle called the no-cloning theorem [52]. Therefore, an attempt for interception of the
signals (quantum states) from someone that has access to the communication channel,
called traditionally Eve, is leading at the same time to the interception’s detection by
the parties due to the injected noise. In other words, a copy and resend strategy by the
eavesdropper can be tracked and quantified by the honest parties.
In fact, by channel parameter estimation, the parties evaluate the correlations between
their data strings and estimate the amount of information Eve has on their signals. Then
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by applying error correction, they end up with common data strings. Both of these
steps may need sacrifice of part of the data string (see also Chap. 6). Finally, by privacy
amplification the parties reduce their data string by an amount indicated by the parameter
estimation step so as Eve’s knowledge on the remaining data string has been eliminated
to an insignificant amount.
The steps of classical post processing require a classical communication channel be-
tween the parties apart from the quantum channel used for transferring the quantum
signals mentioned before. Although this channel is not private it should be authenticated
meaning that the two parties should acquire a pre-shared key in order to be able to rec-
ognize each other. This fact makes actually the QKD a key expansion task rather than a
key creation one.
In a CV setting the quantum states that are used are bosonic states, e.g., coherent
states, which form an non-orthogonal basis (see Eq. (2.46)) and can be efficiently produced
in an experimental configuration and sent through optical fibre communication channels
using the current technology. More specifically, if these protocols use a Gaussian random
variable to encode on the Gaussian states then are called fully Gaussian protocols. They
were firstly introduced in Ref. [9–11]. In the following, we present such one-way protocols.
In this thesis we assume that these protocols are the central elements of our study in the
sense that protocols we present later can be considered as their variations. In the following
sections, we use these fully Gaussian protocols as examples for introducing CV-QKD.
3.2 Gaussian modulation of coherent states
Here we describe the one-way protocols using Gaussian modulation of coherent states in
the prepare and measure representation. These protocols can be described as one protocol
with different versions as explained in the following discussion.
Alice prepares coherent states |a〉〈a| with amplitude a = QM + iPM by displacing vac-
uum states according to a random variable XM = (QM , PM ) following the normal distri-
bution with variance VM = (Var(QM ),Var(PM )). We assume here that both quadratures
are modulated symmetrically, i.e, Var(QM ) = Var(PM ) =: VM . As a result, Alice’s input
mode A is described by quadrature operators
QˆA = QM + Qˆ0 and PˆA = PM + Pˆ0, (3.1)
where Qˆ0 = aˆ + aˆ
† and Pˆ0 = i(aˆ† − aˆ) with aˆ and aˆ† being annihilation and creation
54
3.3 Security analysis
operators of mode A, which initially was in the vacuum state and had variance V0 = 1
corresponding to the quantum fluctuations. This mode propagates through the channel
controlled by Eve and arrives to Bob as the output mode B. Bob chooses randomly
between the quadrature p or q and applies a homodyne or heterodyne detection on mode
B. If Bob uses the homodyne detection, he ends up with a string of values of QB and PB.
By informing Alice for his choice of quadrature, Alice keeps only the relevant quadrature of
the pairs (QM , PM ) resulting with a string of values QM and PM with the same quadrature
sequence as Bob’s string. This defines the version of the protocol with switching [9]
and without loss of generality, from now on, we will assume that Bob always chooses
to make a measurement on only one quadrature, e.g., quadrature q. Another option for
Bob is to apply a heterodyne detection which defines the no-switching version of the
protocol [11]. Here Bob keeps both the pairs (QB, PB), which along with Alice’s pairs
(QM , PM ) constitute of the two data stings from which they are going to extract the
secret key.
3.3 Security analysis
The security of a protocol is usually described as a state discrimination problem. In this
case Alice, Bob and Eve share a state that is compared with an ideal secure state. This
is quantified by the distance of the two states which should be less than a very small
parameter ϵ. The ideal state that is shared between the parties and Eve should be
ρˆid = ρˆAB ⊗ ρˆE (3.2)
implying that there are no correlations between the system of Alice and Bob AB and the
eavesdropper E. Then we have that
D(ρˆABE , ρˆid) ≤ ϵ, (3.3)
where D is the trace distance [53]. In other words, the previous relation states that the
state ρˆABE cannot be distinguished from ρˆid with a probability 1− ϵ, in the sense, that if
ϵ→ 0 then the two states are identical.
Remark: A security analysis under a composable framework takes into account dif-
ferent tasks of a protocol. For the i-th task there is a target state that is indistinguishable
from a corresponding ideal state with a probability ϵi. Then the security parameter
ϵ =
∑
i
ϵi
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Figure 3.1: Schematic configuration of the protocol: Alice prepares coherent states (gray disks)
in mode A with modulated amplitude by a Gaussian distribution with variance VM = µ − 1 and
µ equal with the radius of the black circle (phase space representqation of Alice’s average state).
Then mode A is send through the channel found under the control of Eve to Bob. For most of
the canonical forms the channel can be represented by Eve possesing two modes e0 and e1 found
in a TMSV state with variance ω and a symplectic transformation M acting only on mode A and
e1. Then the output mode B is measured by Bob either with a homodyne measurement applyed
randomly on its q or p quadrature or else with a heterodyne measurement.
is given as the sum of the parameters ϵi. A detailed discussion about composable security
is found in Ref. [16]. In Chap. 9, we will see how this concept is applied to the MDI
protocol of Chap. 5.
In order to assess the performance of a given protocol in terms of security, one can
introduce the secret key rate in the asymptotic limit, i.e., for infinite number of exchanged
signals N ≫ 1. The following formula is based on the privacy amplification procedure
(leftover hash lemma [3]). According to this, secret key bits can be still extracted from
a random variable with large probability although it is verified that a given amount has
already been disclosed to an eavesdropper. Later it was generalized in the quantum regime
by Ref. [13] (see also Ref. [54] for the case of CV) giving
R∞ = max{0, IAB − IE}, (3.4)
where IAB stands for the mutual information (see Eq.(2.75)) between Alice’s and Bob’s
classical variables, while IE stands for the accessible information of Eve on Alice’s or Bob’s
classical variable depending on the direction of the reconciliation process. The secret key
rate is manifested as a lower bound because usually Eve’s accessible information is assumed
to be as large as the laws of nature allow realizing the worst case scenario for Alice and Bob.
In order to calculate the secret key rate, we need some assumptions for the eavesdropping
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Figure 3.2: Individual attacks are described by the interaction of each Eve’s ancillary mode with a
signal by a unitary operator U . The output mode is measured directly after the interaction.
attack.
3.4 Eavesdropping
The classification of the three type of the attacks that characterize Eve’s strategy in
order to intercept the communication between Alice and Bob are the individual, collective
and coherent attacks in increasing order of power. In order to describe an attack, one
can adopt the dilation of the channel (see Fig. 2.3), which is under Eve’s full control.
Therefore, the signal states travelling through the channel interact with Eve’s ancillary
modes which are processed finally by Eve. Different configurations for the ancillary initial
state and the interaction described by the unitary operation result in attacks with different
potential [2, 3].
3.4.1 Individual attacks
During individual attacks depicted in Fig. 3.2, Eve prepares ancillary modes for every
signal state between Alice and Bob. Each signal mode and ancillary mode interact via a
unitary operator U and Eve’s output mode is measured before the classical communication
through the public channel takes place. Therefore, both the quantities IAB and IE in the
secret key rate of Eq. (3.44) are calculated by the mutual information of the classical
variables of the parties involved. These variables are dependent on the unitary operation
as well as the applied measurements [55].
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Figure 3.3: In collective attacks Eve is interacting with each signal separately during the intercep-
tion by correlating an ancillary mode which is stored in a quantum memory. After the end of the
protocol (classical communication) Eve applies an optimal measurement simultaneously to all the
ancillary modes for every use of the channel. Thus collective attacks are considered more powerful
than the individual ones.
3.4.2 Collective attacks
In the case of a collective attack, Eve prepares her ancillary modes, where each one is
interacting through a unitary operator U with a signal sent from Alice to Bob. After
the interaction, Eve’s output modes are stored in a quantum memory. This gives the
advantage to Eve to apply an optimal coherent measurement to the quantum memory after
the reconciliation process between Alice and Bob through the public channel. Due to this
setting, Eve’s information about Alice’s or Bob’s variable is restricted theoretically only by
the laws of nature. Thus Eve’s accessible information IE in Eq. (3.44) is quantified by the
Holevo bound χ(E : x) (see Eq. (2.82)) for x being Alice’s or Bob’s variable respectively.
The most effective strategy for Eve is to use a Gaussian unitary operator (see Fig. 3.3)
in order to interact with the signals [56–59]. More specifically, one associates to a pure
global state ρˆABE with CM VABE , that describes the systems of the parties and Eve, its
Gaussian counterpart ρˆGABE with the same CM. Then, it turns out that we obtain the
following bound for the secret key rate
K(ρˆABE) ≥ K(ρˆGABE). (3.5)
As we have seen previously, the most realistic Gaussian channel simulating an optical-fibre
communication channel is the entangling cloner (see Sec. 2.5.1.1). From now on, we will
use this kind of attack in order to calculate the secret key rate.
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3.4.3 Coherent attacks
The most powerful attack for Eve is the coherent attack illustrated in Fig. 3.4. In this case,
Eve prepares a global ancillary system which interacts by a global unitary operator with
all the signals sent through the channel. Eve stores the outputs of the ancillary systems in
a quantum memory, waits for the reconciliation process between Alice and Bob over the
public channel to be finished, and applies an optimal joint measurement on the quantum
memory. The study of the security against these attacks is extremely complex and in the
most general case cannot be solved analytically. Nevertheless, there have been results that
allow to tackle with the complexity of the problem and reduce it to a simplified scenario.
In particular, in Ref. [60], it has been proved also for infinite dimensional systems (CV
Figure 3.4: During a coherent attack Eve prepares a global ancillary system which interacts with
every signal with a global unitary operator. The outputs of the interaction corresponding to the
ancillary system are stored in a quantum memory, to which an optimal joint measurement is applied
after the end of the protocol and the classical communication between Alice and Bob.
systems) the quantum de Finetti theorem. According to this theorem, the study of these
attacks can be reduced to collective attacks whenever the shared state between Alice and
Bob after many uses of the channel ρ⊗nAB is invariant under any permutation of the systems.
This can be satisfied in general by randomization of the classical data during the classical
post-processing.
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3.5 Asymptotic secret key rate
3.5.1 Mode propagation
In the worst case scenario, Eve has the full control of the channel. For assessing the
security of the protocol, we use the assumption of collective attacks. More specifically,
since our protocol is fully Gaussian, in the sense that Alice modulates coherent states
with a Gaussian modulation, the worst attack would be describe by a Gaussian channel.
The most realistic situation of a Gaussian channel is that of a thermal-loss channel (see
Sec. 2.5.1.1), e.g., optical fibre telecommunication channels, with transmissivity τ and
thermal noise ω = 2n¯+1, as in Fig. 3.1. The last two modes e0 and e1 belong to Eve and
their CM is given by
Ve1e0 =
 ωI √ω2 − 1I√
ω2 − 1I ωI
 , Z =
1 0
0 −1
 . (3.6)
The corresponding beam-splitter symplectic transformation is expressed as L(τ) =M(τ)⊕
I where M(τ) = B(τ) as in Eq. (2.67).
According to this propagation, Bob’s mode is described by the quadrature operators
QˆB =
√
τ(QM + Qˆ0) +
√
1− τQˆe1 , (3.7)
PˆB =
√
τ(PM + Pˆ0)−
√
1− τPˆe1 (3.8)
for the switching protocol and
QˆB′ =
√
τ
2
(QM + Qˆ0) +
√
τ − 1
2
Qˆe1 +
√
1
2
Qˆvac, (3.9)
PˆB′ =−
√
τ
2
(PM + Pˆ0) +
√
τ − 1
2
Pˆe1 +
√
1
2
Pˆvac (3.10)
for the no-switching protocol, where Qˆ0, Pˆ0, Qˆvac, Pˆvac have variance V0 = Vvac = 1. The
variables QB′ and PB′ for the protocol with heterodyne detection (see Sec. 2.5.2) comes
from the fact that Bob applies a heterodyne measurement by mixing the incoming mode
B with a vacuum mode associated with the operators Qˆvac and Pˆvac by a balanced beam
splitter. To every quadrature operator Xˆ with variance V we can assign a random variable
X that describes a potential measurement outcome (its eigenvalues as in Eq. (2.20)).
Therefore, we can describe the variables QB (QB′) and PB (PB′) in terms of signal and
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noise as follows:
QB =
√
τQM +QN , QN =
√
τQ0 +
√
1− τQe1 , (3.11)
PB =
√
τPM + PN , QN =
√
τP0 −
√
1− τPe1 (3.12)
QB′ =
√
τ
2
QM +QN ′ , QN ′ =
√
τ
2
Q0 +
√
τ − 1
2
Qe1 +
√
1
2
Qvac, (3.13)
PB′ =−
√
τ
2
PM + PN ′ , PN ′ = −
√
τ
2
P0 +
√
τ − 1
2
Pe1 +
√
1
2
Pvac (3.14)
and their corresponding variances are
VB =τVM + VN , (3.15)
VN =τ + (1− τ)(ω) = 1 + Vϵ = 1 + (1− τ)(ω − 1) (3.16)
VB′ =
τ
2
VM + VN ′ , (3.17)
VN ′ =
τ + (1− τ)ω + 1
2
=
2 + (1− τ)(ω − 1)
2
=
VN + 1
2
, (3.18)
where QN (QN ′) and PN (PN ′) are the noise variables of the quadratures of mode B
respectively with variance VN (VN ′ ).
Eve’s mode after the propagation will be described by the quadrature operators
Qˆe2 =−
√
1− τ(QM + Qˆ0) +
√
τQˆe1 , (3.19)
Pˆe2 =−
√
1− τ(PM + Pˆ0) +
√
τPˆe1 (3.20)
with variance
Ve2 = (1− τ)(VM + 1) + τ + τ(ω − 1) = (1− τ)µ+ τω (3.21)
and the CM of her average state will be given by
Ve2e0 =
(τω + (1− τ)µ) I √τ(ω2 − 1)Z√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z ωI,
 , (3.22)
with µ = VM + 1. The CM of Eve’s conditional state in direct reconciliation is obtained
by setting µ = 1 in the variance of the relevant quadrature with respect the applied
measurement. For instance, in the case of a homodyne measurement we have
Ve2e0|QM =
 V √τ(ω2 − 1)Z√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z ωI
 , V = diag{(1− τ) + τω, Ve2} (3.23)
while for a heterodyne measurement
Ve2e0|QMPM =
(τω + (1− τ)) I √τ(ω2 − 1)Z√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z ωI.
 , (3.24)
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In the case of reverse reconciliation, we apply the homodyne and heterodyne formulas
of Eq. (2.71) and Eq. (2.72) to mode B of the CM of ρˆe2e1B in order to calculate the
conditional one. These covariance matrices are given by
Ve2e0B =

Ve2I
√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z D√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z ωI d
D d diag{VQˆB , VPˆB}I
 , (3.25)
where the matrices D and d are describing the correlations of mode B with mode e2
and e0 respectively. By using Eq. (3.7), Eq. (3.9) respectively and Eq. (3.19) along with
Eq. (3.22), we have
D =
√
τ(1− τ)(VM + 1− ω)I, (3.26)
d =
√
1− τ(ω2 − 1)Z. (3.27)
The resulting conditional covariance matrices are
Ve2e0|QB =
A C
C B
 , (3.28)
with
A =
 (VM+1)ωτ(VM+1−ω)+ω 0
0 τ(VM + 1) + (1− τ)ω
 , (3.29)
B =
 1−τ+τ(VM+1)ωτ(VM+1)+(1−τ)ω 0
0 ω
 , (3.30)
C =
√τ(ω2 − 1( (VM+1)τ(VM+1)+(1−τ)ω) 0
0 −√τ(ω2 − 1
 , (3.31)
and
Ve2e0|QB′PB′ =
aI cZ
cZ bI
 , (3.32)
with
a =
(1− τ)(VM + 1) + [τ + (VM + 1)]ω
1 + τ(VM + 1) + (1− τ)ω , (3.33)
b =
(1− τ) + [1 + τ(VM + 1)]ω
1 + τ(VM + 1) + (1− τ)ω , (3.34)
c =
√
τ(ω2 − 1
(
(VM + 2)
τ(VM + 1) + (1− τ)ω + 1
)
. (3.35)
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Figure 3.5: The secret key rate for direct reconciliation (solid lines) and reverse reconciliation
(dashed lines) versus the attenuation in dB. The black lines correspond to the protocol with the
homodyne detection while the grey lines to the protocol with the heterodyne detection. We have
plotted the ideal case for ξ = 1 and VM → ∞ given by the corresponding formulas in Eq. (3.40–
3.43). We can see that the rates with reverse reconciliation can beat the 3dB limit in contrast to
the rates with direct reconciliation.
3.5.2 Mutual information and Holevo information
The mutual information is not dependent on the reconciliation direction but is dependent
on Bob’s measurement. In particular, IAB is given by
Ihom =
1
2
log2
VQˆB
VQˆB |QM
(3.36)
=
1
2
log2
τ(VM + 1) + (1− τ)ω
τ + (1− τ)ω (3.37)
for a protocol with homodyne measurement. Both the quadratures are treated in the
same way by this protocol. Thus, even though Bob in reality is switching between the
quadratures for applying the measurement, for the mutual information calculation, we can
assume that Bob is always choosing to measure with respect to one of them (e.g. QˆB).
On the other hand, for a protocol with heterodyne detection the contribution of both
quadratures have to be taken into account. Therefore, the formula of the mutual informa-
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Figure 3.6: The security thresholds for of the direct reconciliation (solid lines) and reverse reconcil-
iation (dashed lines) with respect the transmissivity τ and excess noise ϵ. The black lines correspond
to the switching protocol (homodyne detection) and the gray ones to the protocol without switching
(heterodyne detection).
tion IAB in that case is given by
Ihet =
1
2
log2
VQˆB′
VQˆB′ |QM
+
1
2
log2
VPˆB′
VPˆB′ |QM
(3.38)
= log2
τ(VM + 1) + (1− τ)ω + 1
τ + (1− τ)ω + 1 , (3.39)
where we have replaced from Eq. (4.21–4.24). From the CMs of Sec. 3.5.1, we obtain
the symplectic eigenvalues of Eve’s average and conditional state depending on Bob’s
measurement and the reconciliation direction. By using Eq. (2.82), the following remarks
and Eq. (2.78), we can calculate the Holevo information IE = χ(E : x) where x is QA,PA
or QB, PB.
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3.5.3 Secret key rate for infinite modulation
We can have analytic expressions for the secret key rates of each of the four variations of
the protocol by assuming infinite modulation µ→∞ for µ = VM + 1. Then we have,
RIhom(τ, ω) =
1
2
log2
τ
1− τ
τω + 1− τ
τ + (1− τ)ω + h
(√
(τ + (1− τ)ω)ω
τω + 1− τ
)
− h(ω), (3.40)
RIhet(τ, ω) = log2
2τ
e(1− τ)[τ + (1− τ)ω + 1] + h (τ + (1− τ)ω)− h(ω), (3.41)
RJhom(τ, ω) =
1
2
log2
1
1− τ
ω
τ + (1− τ)ω − h(ω), (3.42)
RJhet(τ, ω) =
1
2
log2
τ
1− τ
2
τ + (1− τ)ω + 1 + h
(
(1− τω) + 1
τ
)
− h(ω), (3.43)
where I (J) stands for the direct (reverse) reconciliation. We have plot the previous
rate in Fig. 3.5 in terms of attenuation in dB by substituting τ = 10−
dB
10 . In the same
manner, we can have expressions for the secret key rate dependent on the excess noise
ϵ = (1−τ)(ω−1)τ . In Fig. 3.6, we plotted the security thresholds in terms of ϵ and τ .
3.5.4 Numerical calculation of the secret key rate
In the case the reconciliation code is not efficient enough in order to provide with the
maximum potential correlations between the honest party variables, the secret key rate of
Eq. (3.44) is modified by adding the reconciliation efficiency parameter ξ [54], namely
R∞ = ξIAB − IE . (3.44)
This in fact can be seen as a result of finite-size effects (see Chap. 6, Chap. 9). More
specifically, in the ideal case of infinite number of signal exchange, we expect that the
classical post-processing can result in a flawless error correction procedure so that the
parties achieve the maximum correlations between their variables. This allows the whole
mutual information to take part on the secret key rate calculation meaning that ξ = 1. In
a realistic scenario, when the signal exchange is finite, the parties share only a fraction of
the mutual information so that 0 < ξ < 1.
In this case, the calculation of secret key rate function is not straight forward since
then there is a dependence not only on the channel parameters, e.g., transmissivity τ and
thermal noise ω but also on the modulation µ = VM +1. In fact, we can see that for every
transmissivity τ there is a different value for µ that gives the highest rate (see Fig. 3.7).
That is why we usually consider the asymptotic secret key rate as a function
R(ξ, µ, ω, τ) = ξIAB − IE (3.45)
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Figure 3.7: Secret key rate versus modulation variance VM of the reverse reconciliation protocol
using homodyne detection. The solid lines correspond to reconciliation efficiency ξ = 0.9, the higher
for transmissivity τ = 0.6 and the lower for τ = 0.2. The dashed lines have been plotted fro ξ = 1
for the corresponding transmissivities. We can see that the value of the secret key rate saturates
after a certain value of modulation for the case ξ = 1. This is not the same for cases ξ < 1 that
there is a maximum for the secret key rate different for different values of transmissivities when
for instance ξ = 0.9.
and we present results with numerical calculations after optimizing over the modulation
µ = VM + 1.
3.6 Phase-encoded coherent states
A potential treatment to the previous deficiency of the reconciliation codes with respect
to a Gaussian (continuous) distribution of coherent states can be given by using discrete
modulation schemes for which very good reconciliation codes exist [8] (see also Fig. 3.12.
These schemes are usually described by a given number N of coherent states centred on
discrete points on phase space. If these points share the same distance from the center
of the phase space and as a consequence the same energy and only vary with respect
their discrete phase differences, then we have a scheme as in Ref. [48] using phase-encoded
coherent states.
Consider a discrete variable XA = {ak, pk} with k = 1, 2, . . . , N following a uniform
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Figure 3.8: Alice prepares mode A in one of the four coherent states with radius z and sends
it to Bob through a thermal-loss channel dilated into an entangling-cloner attack. In particular,
the beam splitter has transmissivity τ , characterizing the channel loss, and the variance ω ≥ 1
of Eve’s TMSV state provides additional thermal noise to the channel. Eve’s output modes are
stored in a quantum memory measured at the end of the protocol, i.e., after the entire quantum
communication and Alice and Bob’s classical communication. At the output of the channel, Bob
applies an heterodyne detection to mode B. An upper bound on the performance of the parties can
be computed by assuming that also Bob has a quantum memory that he measures at the end of the
entire communication process.
distribution pk = 1/N . Alice prepares coherent states with amplitude ak = ze
iφk , where
φk =
2pi
N k. The coefficient z describes a fixed radius in the phase space and accounts for the
square root of the mean number of photons n¯ as shown in Fig. 3.8 for a four-state protocol
N = 4. For each use of the channel, the coherent state is prepared on mode A with a
phase chosen from the φk and amplitude z, and is sent through a thermal-loss channel
(see Sec. 2.5.1.1). Its output B is detected by Bob by the application of a heterodyne
measurement. This channel description is not providing an optimal attack assumption for
such a protocol but still remains the most realistic simulation of the current technology
communication channels such as optical fibres.
3.6.1 Upper bound for the secret key rate
We calculate here an upper bound for the secret key rate for the case of a pure loss
channel by setting ω = 1. This upper bound is based on the fact that Bob has a quantum
memory so that he may apply an optimal joint detection. This is achieved by calculating
Bob’s accessible information on Alice’s variable by the use of the Holevo function (see
Eq. (2.82)). By virtue of this analysis, we can investigate the the effect of changing the
values of parameters z and N . For example, we can search for the conditions under which
the protocol has similar performance for N = 4 coherent states compared with the case
of N →∞ coherent states.
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Figure 3.9: The von Neumann entropy S(ρA) of the Alice’s average state ρA for different number
N over the radius z of the constellation circle (solid lines). We plotted also the entropy of the
continuous uniform distribution (N →∞) of the constellation states (dashed line).
Alice’s average state before the channel propagation is given by an ensemble of N
coherent states |ak〉 distributed with the same probability pk = 1/N
ρA =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
|ak〉〈ak|, (3.46)
which is parametrized by N and z. The von Neumann entropy S(ρA) (see Eq. 2.77) has
been plotted in Fig. 3.9 with respect to the radius of the encoding scheme z for different
N . In Appendix B.1, we use a preliminary Gram-Schmidt procedure in order to compute
this entropy. We notice that the entropy S(ρA) is increasing as the number of states in
the circle becomes larger. For any given N , the entropy saturates to a constant value after
a certain value of the radius z. We also compare with the case of N →∞, where we have
calculated the corresponding average state in Appendix B.2.
By assuming a pure loss channel with transmissivity τ ∈ (0, 1) and ω = 1, we can
obtain Bob’s average state
ρB =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
|√τak〉〈
√
τak|. (3.47)
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Figure 3.10: The optimal secret key rate of Eq. (7) for N=4 is plotted over the transmissivity τ
for different values of the radius z of the constellation. We can see that for values z < 1 the rate
decreases as z is decreasing (blue lines) while for the z > 1 the rate decreases as z increases till it
gets to zero for z = 106 (green lines). We also plotted the optimal secret key rate for the continuous
uniform distribution of states (black dashed lines). We see that for z < 0.6 the two rates become
almost identical. This corresponds to a saturation point for the 4-state protocol , so that it makes
no difference to use four coherent states or an infinite number.
Then the corresponding Holevo information in this case will be given by
χ(B : ak) = S(ρB)− 1
N
N−1∑
k=0
S(|ak〉〈ak|). (3.48)
This relation is simplified by the fact that a coherent state is a pure state and thus its von
Neumann entropy is zero leading to χ(B : ak) = S(ρB) (see remarks after Def. 2.6.3). We
follow the same steps as above for this Holevo information calculation. Accordingly, the
eavesdropper keeps the other output of the beam splitter, mode E′, and her average state
will be given by
ρE′ =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
|√1− τak〉〈
√
1− τak| (3.49)
and her accessible information by
χ(E′ : ak) = S(ρE′). (3.50)
Therefore, the optimal secret key rate will be given by Eq. (3.44), where we have set
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Figure 3.11: We plotted the optimal rate (upper bound) as a function of the radius z with fixed
transmissivities τ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9. We can observe that there are certain values that maximize
the rate for a given transmissivity.
IAB = χ(B : ak) and IE = χ(E
′ : ak), which finally is turning into
Ropt = S(ρB)− S(ρE′). (3.51)
In Fig. 3.10, we plotted this optimal rate for N = 4 as a function of the transmissivity
τ and for different values of the radius z. We notice that there is an optimal intermediate
value for z. This means that z cannot be too small resulting in states very close to the
vacuum states neither too large leading to almost perfectly distinguishable states. Then,
we also show that the optimal performance for the N = 4 protocol is very near to that
of the protocol with continuous distribution of coherent states for the same values of the
radius z. In Fig. 3.11, we see that the rate is maximized by a specific value of z for any
given value of the transmissivity.
3.6.2 Secret key rate
Due to the current technological restrictions, a realistic assumption for the secret key rate
is that Bob cannot have a quantum memory and thus an optimal collective measurement.
In particular, we assume here that Bob applies to mode B a heterodyne detection in each
channel use. Therefore, the corresponding term IAB of Eq. (3.44) is calculated now by
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using the classical mutual information I(XA : XB) (see Eq. (2.75)), where XA = {ak, pk}
with pk = 1/N and XB = {b, p(b)} and b is the continuous outcome of Bob’s heterodyne
detection.
It is obvious that H(XA) = log2N . Then in order to quantify I(XA : XB), we need
to calculate H(XA|XB) through p(ak|b), i.e., the probability that the state |ak〉 was sent
through the channel given that Bob measured the amplitude b.
To do so, we first calculate the probability that Bob measures b given that the coherent
state |αk〉 was sent through the channel, p(b|ak) = 1pie−|b−
√
τak|2 , and by the use of Bayes’
rule we obtain
p(ak|b) = 1
Npip(b)
e−|b−
√
τak|2 , (3.52)
where p(b) = 1N
∑N
k=0 p(b|ak).
Then the asymptotic key rate for the direct reconciliation is given by setting IAB =
I(XA : XB) and IE = S(ρE′) in Eq. (3.44) obtaining
R = I(XA : XB)− S(ρE′), (3.53)
which is plotted in Fig. 11.1 for N = 4. Afterwards, we consider the case of a pure-
loss channel in reverse reconciliation. We just need to re-compute Eve’s Holevo bound
(now with respect to Bob’s outcomes). More specifically, we need to re-compute Eve’s
conditional entropy. Eve’s state conditioned to Bob’s outcome b is
ρE′|b =
N−1∑
k=0
p(ak|b)|
√
1− τak〉〈
√
1− τak|, (3.54)
where p(ak|b) is given in Eq. (3.52). We can then compute S(ρE′|b) which is now depending
on b. Using this quantity, we may write the secret-key rate
R = I(XA : XB)− S(ρE′) +
∫
d2bp(b)S(ρE′|b). (3.55)
This rate is plotted in Fig. 3.12 optimizing over z for N = 4. We compare it with the
the rate from the fully Gaussian protocol. Also it has been plotted in Fig. 11.4 for the
four-state protocol N = 4 and radius z = 0.1.
3.7 Conclusion
Here we presented the one-way protocols which use Gaussian modulation of coherent
states under the assumption of an entangling cloner attack and studied their security in
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Figure 3.12: The secret key rate for the protocol with Gaussian modulation (blue line) and using
only N = 4 states (black line) optimized over VM and z respectively. For the case of Gaussian
modulation we used a reconciliation parameter equal to ξ = 0.9. For the 4-state protocol we
assumed an ideal reconciliation which is very close to the practical implementations due to the
discrete encoding that this protocol supports. We see that the two rates are comparable in the sense
that it can be achieved almost the same result by using a simpler and cheaper in resources encoding
and decoding process. We have also plotted the ideal case of Gaussian modulation protocol with
ξ = 1 for the sake of comparison.
the asymptotic regime. We considered the secret key rate as the key quantity to assess
the a protocol in terms of security combined with performance in achievable distances.
We also presented protocols using discrete encoding. In the following chapters, we will
also address the cases of one-way protocols using thermal states instead (see Chap. 4) and
the CV-MDI protocol (see Chap. 5) which can expand the CV-QKD to setting allowing
for the use of different frequencies and also to network configurations for multiple users.
I would like to mention that the plots in this chapter and particularly the study and the
plots of Sec. 3.6.1 are my contribution. I chose to put them in the preliminaries context
for the sake of the later discussion since they are not belonging in contributions of the
recent advancements in CV-QKD.
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Chapter 4
One-way protocols using thermal
states
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present protocols that use Gaussian displacement of thermal states
(instead of coherent states as in Sec. 3.2) investigated in Ref. [19,20]. Our calculations are
based on Ref. [22]. Thermal states can be understood as noisy versions of coherent states
resulting, for instance, from usage of imperfect devices [23] such as cheap laser sources.
Such noise appearing in the preparation can be trusted [23] in the sense that its source
has been modeled and calibrated so as to be separated from the untrusted channel noise
attributed to Eve. However by increasing the mean photon number we can have laser
sources in different frequencies. In particular, this allows for a QKD application in the
microwave regime. In order to assess their performance, we assume a quantum thermal
loss channel between Alice and Bob that is simulated by an entangling cloner and we
follow the way we presented results in Sec. 3.5. Later in Chap. 7 we extend this protocols
security in the non-asymptotic regime based on the method presented in Chap. 6.
4.2 The protocol and propagation of the modes
In the prepare and measure scheme, Alice prepares thermal states with mean photon
number n¯ = Vth2 . The CM of this state is given by
VA =
Vth + Vs 0
0 Vth + 1/Vs
 , (4.1)
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Figure 4.1: Scheme of the Gaussian protocol using thermal states. Alice prepares a vacuum states
with additional thermal trusted noise, i.e., a thermal state (larger white circle). These are travelling
through the channel simulated by an entangling cloner. Afterwards, Bob is applying a homodyne
measurement.
where Vth accounts for the variance due to the extra number of thermal photons and
Vs := 1 is the variance due to quantum fluctuations (quantum shot noise). In case Alice
was preparing squeezed states with extra thermal photons then 0 < Vs < 1. Then she
modulates their amplitude by a Gaussian distribution with variance VM and sends them
to Bob through a thermal noise channel as in Fig. 4.1. In the Heisenberg picture, Alice’s
mode A is described by the quadrature operators QˆA and PˆA, where
QˆA = QM + Qˆ0 and PˆA = PM + Pˆ0, (4.2)
while Qˆ0 = a+a
† and Pˆ0 = i(a†−a) and a, a† are the creation and annihilation operators
of mode A. The variables QM and PM are classical stochastic variables following the
normal distribution and accounting for the random displacement of the thermal states in
the phase space.
Then modeA and Eve’s mode E are mixed by a beam splitter (see Fig. 4.1)characterized
by transmissivity τ . The outputs of the beam splitter are given by
QˆB =
√
τQˆA +
√
1− τQˆE (4.3)
PˆB =
√
τPˆA +
√
1− τPˆE (4.4)
QˆE′ =−
√
1− τQˆA +
√
τQˆE (4.5)
PˆE′ =−
√
1− τPˆA +
√
τPˆE . (4.6)
We associate to each quadrature operator Xˆ with variance V a random variable X
which describes the its potential measurement outcome following a Gaussian distribution
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with variance V . And then we describe the measurement outcomes in terms of signal and
noise
QB =
√
τQM +QN , QN =
√
τQ0 +
√
1− τQE (4.7)
PB =
√
τPM + PN , PN =
√
τP0 +
√
1− τPE (4.8)
Given that Eve’s modes are found in a TMSV states, their CM is given by
VEe =
 ω √ω2 − 1√
ω2 − 1 ω
 , (4.9)
so that the variances of the modes B and E′ are given by
VQˆB =τ(VM + Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω (4.10)
VPˆB =τ(VM + Vth + 1/Vs) + (1− τ)ω (4.11)
VQˆE′
=(1− τ)(VM + Vth + Vs) + τω (4.12)
VPˆE′
=(1− τ)(VM + Vth + 1/Vs) + τω. (4.13)
We also group the variances in terms of signal and noise
VQB =τVM + VN , VN = τ(Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω = 1 + τ(Vs − 1 + Vth) + Vϵ (4.14)
VPB =τVM + VN , VN = τ(Vth + 1/Vs) + (1− τ)ω = 1 + τ(1/Vs − 1 + Vth) + Vϵ (4.15)
where Vϵ = τϵ is the variance due to the excess noise ϵ =
(1−τ)(ω−1)
τ .
As a result, Eve’s CM after the propagation of the channel will be given by
VE′e =
 VE′I √τω2 − 1Z√
τω2 − 1Z ωI
 . (4.16)
where VE′ = [(1− τ)(VM + Vth + 1) + τω] and VQˆE′ = VPˆE′ = VE′ for Vs = 1.
Afterwards Bob Applies a homodyne or heterodyne detection on mode B depending
on the version of the protocol. In the case of a homodyne detection, the corresponding
conditional variances on Alice’s variables QM and PM are given by
VQˆB |QM =τ(Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω (4.17)
VPˆB |PM =τ(Vth + 1/Vs) + (1− τ)ω (4.18)
VQˆE′ |QM =(1− τ)(Vth + Vs) + τω (4.19)
VPˆE′ |PM =(1− τ)(Vth + 1/Vs) + τω. (4.20)
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calculated by either using the formula [61]
Var(Qˆ|Q) = Var(Qˆ)− |〈QˆQ〉|
2
Var(Q)
or in our case by simply setting VM := 0 in Eq. (4.10–4.13).
In case of a heterodyne detection, Bob’s mode is mixed with the mode C in a balanced
beam splitter, which is found in the vacuum state. Then the outputs of the beam splitter
B′ and C ′ have the following variances
VQB′ = VQC′ =
1
2
(VQB + 1) (4.21)
VPB′ = VQC′ =
1
2
(VPB + 1) (4.22)
Afterwards conjugate homodyne detections are applied to the two outputs and we obtain
the conditional variances
VQB′ |QM =
1
2
(τ(Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω + 1) (4.23)
VPB′ |PM =
1
2
(τ(Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω + 1) (4.24)
by replacing from Eq. (4.10–4.13) and setting VM = 0.
4.3 Secret key rate
The secret key rate in the asymptotic regime is calculated by the mutual information
of Alice and Bob minus the accessible information (Holevo function) that Eve has on
the Alice’s or Bob’s variable depending on the reconciliation process. More specifically,
the latter is obtained by the difference of the von Neumann entropies corresponding to
the total state of Eve after the end of the protocol and to the conditional state of Eve
on the given variable. So we are going to present calculations for the four different rates
describing the four variations of the protocol depending on Bob’s measurement (homodyne
vs heterodyne) and on the direction of the reconciliation.
The mutual information is not dependent on the reconciliation direction but is depen-
dent on Bob’s measurement. In particular, it is given by
Ihom =
1
2
log2
VQˆB
VQˆB |QM
= (4.25)
=
1
2
log2
τ(VM + Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω
τ(Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω (4.26)
for a protocol with homodyne measurement. Both the quadratures are treated in the
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Figure 4.2: The secret key rate of the direct reconciliation protocol using homodyne detection and
thermal states. We assumed a pure loss channel ω = 1, very large modulation µ ∼ 106 and ideal
reconciliation efficiency ξ = 1. We have plotted the cases of Vth = 0 (black line), Vth = 1 (blue
line), Vth = 2 (green line) and Vth = 4 (red line). For the sake of comparison, we plotted the case
of ξ = 0.95 and ω = 1.01 with Vth = 4 (red dashed line).
same way by this protocol. Thus even though Bob in reality is switching between the
quadratures for applying the measurement in order to calculate the mutual information
we can assume that Bob is always choosing to measure with respect to one of them (e.g.
QˆB).
On the other hand, for a protocol with heterodyne detection the contribution of both
the quadratures have to be taken into account. Therefore, the formula of the mutual
information in that case is given by
Ihet =
1
2
log2
VQˆB′
VQˆB′ |QM
+
1
2
log2
VPˆB′
VPˆB′ |QM
(4.27)
= log2
τ(VM + Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω + 1
τ(Vth + Vs) + (1− τ)ω + 1 (4.28)
where we have replaced from Eq. (4.21–4.24).
Firstly, we will calculate the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s state with the help of the
CV VE′e. This quantity is common for every version of the protocol. We first calculate
its symplectic eigenvalues obtaining
ν±E′e =
1
2
[
√
(VE′ + ω)2 − 4τ(ω2 − 1)± (VE′ − ω)] (4.29)
77
Chapter 4: One-way protocols using thermal states
0 0.5 1 1.5
Attenuation in dB
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
R
ea
te
(b
it
s/
u
se
)
Figure 4.3: The corresponding secret key rates of Fig. 4.2 for the direct reconciliation protocol
with heterodyne detection.
and the the von Neumann entropy will be given by
S(ρE′e) = h(ν
+
E′e) + h(ν
−
E′e). (4.30)
In contrast, the conditional state for each of the four versions of the protocol is different
with different entropies.
Direct reconciliation with homodyne detection Eve’s CM of the conditional state
on Alice’s variable QM is given by
VE′e|QM =
 V √τω2 − 1Z√
τω2 − 1Z ωI
 . (4.31)
with V = diag{VQˆE′ |QM , VPˆE′}.
Direct reconciliation with heterodyne detection Eve’s CM of the conditional state
on Alice’s variable QM is given by
VE′e|QMPM =
 V √τω2 − 1Z√
τω2 − 1Z ωI
 . (4.32)
with V = diag{VQˆE′ |QM , VPˆE′|QM }.
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Figure 4.4: The corresponding secret key rates of Fig. 4.2 for the reverse reconciliation protocol
with homodyne detection.
Reverse reconciliation with homodyne detection For the calculation of Eve’s con-
ditional matrix on Bob’s variable QB, we apply the rule of homodyne measurement of
mode B to the CM
VE′eB =

VEI
√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z D√
τ(ω2 − 1)Z ωI d
D d diag{VQˆB , VPˆB}I,
 (4.33)
where the matrices D and d are describing the correlations of mode B with mode E′ and
e respectively. By using Eq. (4.3–4.6) along with Eq. (4.9), we have
D =
√
τ(1− τ)(VM + Vth + 1− ω)I (4.34)
d =
√
1− τ(ω2 − 1)Z. (4.35)
The resulting conditional CM will be
VE′e|QB =
A C
C B
 , (4.36)
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with
A =
 (VM+Vth+1)ωτ(VM+Vth+1−ω)+ω 0
0 τ(VM + Vth + 1) + (1− τ)ω
 , (4.37)
B =
 1−τ+τ(VM+Vth+1)ωτ(VM+Vth+1)+(1−τ)ω 0
0 ω
 , (4.38)
C =
√τ(ω2 − 1( (VM+Vth+1)τ(VM+Vth+1)+(1−τ)ω) 0
0 −√τ(ω2 − 1
 . (4.39)
Reverse reconciliation with heterodyne detection Correspondingly for the case of
the heterodyne measurement we apply the rule of heterodyne measurement on VE′eB and
we obtain the conditional matrix
VE′e|QB′PB′ =
aI cZ
cZ bI
 , (4.40)
with
a =
(1− τ)(VM + Vth + 1) + [τ + (VM + Vth + 1)]ω
1 + τ(VM + Vth + 1) + (1− τ)ω , (4.41)
b =
(1− τ) + [1 + τ(VM + Vth + 1)]ω
1 + τ(VM + Vth + 1) + (1− τ)ω , (4.42)
c =
√
τ(ω2 − 1
(
(VM + Vth + 2)
τ(VM + Vth + 1) + (1− τ)ω + 1
)
. (4.43)
The secret key rate now is a function of transmissivity τ , modulation variance µ =
VM + 1, channel thermal noise ω and thermal preparation noise Vth and reconciliation
efficiency ξ so that the Eq. (3.45) is modified as follows
R(ξ, µ, τ, ω, Vth) = ξIAB − IE , (4.44)
where the mutual information IAB is given in Eq. (4.25) and the Holevo information IE
is calculated based on the symplectic spectra of the CM in Eq. (4.16) and the covariance
matrices in Eq. (4.31), Eq. (4.32), Eq. (4.36) or Eq. (4.40) depending on the version of the
protocol.
In Fig. 4.2–4.5, we have calculated numerically and plotted the secret key rates of the
four protocols with respect the attenuation of the channel in dB by setting τ = 10−dB/10
for different values of Vth. These rates have been calculated for a pure loss channel by
setting ω = 1 and assuming a very large modulation VM ∼ 106 and ideal reconciliation
efficiency ξ = 1. For the last case of Vth = 4, we also plotted the non-ideal case with
thermal channel noise, where we have set ξ = 0.95 and ω = 1.01.
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Figure 4.5: The corresponding secret key rates of Fig. 4.2 for the reverse reconciliation protocol
with heterodyne detection.
4.4 Secret key rate for different frequencies
The average photon number of a thermal state is dependent on the frequency f according
to the following equation
n¯(f) =
1
exp[hf/kBT ]− 1 , (4.45)
where h is Planck’s constant, kB is Bollzmann’s constant and T is the temperature which is
set to T := 300K (room temperature). This allows us to make the following substitution
Vth = 2n¯(f). Therefore, we can consider secret key rates dependent on frequency and
can evaluate the security performance of the protocol for different frequencies. Note that
here the shot noise level is higher than this in the optical regime and equal to Vth + 1.
Therefore the corresponding “pure loss attack” here will be an entangling cloner attack
for ω = Vth + 1. We have plotted the security thresholds of each version of the protocol
with respect to frequency over transmissivity in Fig. 4.6, where we found that the most
robust protocol with respect to lower frequencies in terms of channel transmissivity is the
direct reconciliation with homodyne detection one.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed about how the preparation noise manifested as thermal states
normally modulated can affect the secret key rate of the one-way protocols. We noticed
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Figure 4.6: Security thresholds for a) direct reconciliation with homodyne detection, b) direct rec-
onciliation with heterodyne detection, c) reverse reconciliation with homodyne detection and d)
direct reconciliation with heterodyne detection with respect the frequency over the transmissivity of
the channel. For comparison we have plotted the line (black solid line) beneath we have microwave
frequencies.
that the direct reconciliation protocol with homodyne detection is particularly robust
to the addition of trusted thermal noise during the preparation of Alice’s states. The
asymptotic secret key rate calculated here will play an important role for the finite-size
security analysis that follows in Chap. 7. By using the connection of the mean photon
number of the preparation noise with the frequency of the electromagnetic field, this
analysis can be extended to the microwave regime. I would like to mention here that the
plots of this chapter is my contribution but for the sake of discussion I believe that are
better to be presented here. Although they are my contribution they do not illustrate any
recent advancements in the field.
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Chapter 5
Measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we presents results from Ref. [29,30] about CV-QKD with continuous vari-
ables. This protocol uses an intermediate relay between Alice and Bob that performs the
measurement for the parties and broadcasts the outputs. The realization of the measure-
ments by a third party provides a counter measure on the most prominent of side-channel
attacks [27], i.e., attacks on the measurement devices. Most interestingly, a secret key
can be extracted even thought the intermediate relay is found under the control of Eve.
Side-channels refer to degrees of freedom of the traveling light connected to the key vari-
able that can hide behind any device imperfection [3, 28]. They can be exploited by the
eavesdropper to learn information about the key without the need of injecting any noise an
thus making her untraceable. This protocol also provides with a scheme for network com-
munications as its topology suggests, i.e., parties connect to a central node. Ref. [32, 33]
introduced such a multi-user protocol. I have done the calculations for Sec. 5.4 based on
the references, however the plot presented there is my contribution.
5.2 Entanglement based representation of the protocol
Alice and Bob hold a TMSV state each with CM
VaA = VBb =
 µI √µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
 (5.1)
83
Chapter 5: Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
Figure 5.1: The figure shows the EB representation of CV-MDI QKD. Alice and Bob have TMSV
states with modes (a,A) and (b,B). Local modes a and b are kept by the parties, while A and B
are sent to the relay through two channels with transmittance τA and τB. When Alice and Bob
heterodyne the local modes, the traveling ones A and B are projected onto coherent states |α〉 and
|β〉. The relay performs a Bell-measurement and broadcast the outcomes γ, creating correlation
between the parties: for instance, Bob recovers Alice variable β by subtracting his variable α from
the relay’s outputs γ. The Gaussian attack on the channels is simulated by Eve using ancillas
E1 and E2, and thermal noise ωA ≥ 1 and ωB ≥ 1, respectively. These ancillary modes are, in
general, two-mode correlated (see text for more details). The ancillary outputs are stored in a
quantum memory for a later measurement.
Then by applying a heterodyne detection to their local modes a and b, with outcomes
a˜ = q˜α+ ip˜α and β˜ = q˜β + ip˜β, they project the remote modes A and B to coherent states
|α〉 and |β〉. This is a method, called entanglement based representation [8,55,61], where
a system is projected to a specific state by measuring part of a larger system including the
initial one. The outcome variables are connected with the displacements of the coherent
states by the following relations
a˜ = ηα⋆, η = (µ+ 1)(µ2 − 1) 12 (5.2)
Then the two remote modes interact with Eve’s modes E1 and E2 in the beam splitters
with transmissivities τA and τB respectively. Eve’s modes are described by the CM
VE1E2 =
ωAI G
G ωBI
 , G =
g 0
0 g′
 . (5.3)
where ωA and ωB quantify Eve’s injected thermal noise. This attack is the extension of
the entangling cloner attack to an attack including two communication channels. In fact,
for g = g′ = 0 this turns into an entangling cloner attack for each channel. However, for
different values of g and g′ the two ancillary modes are correlated. This is described more
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thoroughly in the Supplementary Information of Ref. [29], where are given constraints of
the parameters g and g′. Due to the fact that we use the Holevo information for quantifying
Eve’s information (see remarks after Def. 2.6.4), we need to take into account only Eve’s
modes that interact with the remote modes of Alice and Bob.
The output modes of the beam splitters are then A′, B′, E′1 and E′2 as it is shown in
Fig. 5.1. Therefore, global input state is then described by the CM
VaAE1E2Bb = VaA ⊕VE1,E2 ⊕VBb (5.4)
and the symplectic matrix of the action of the two beam splitters is described by
S1(τA, τB) = I⊕B(τA)⊕B(τB)T ⊕ I, (5.5)
where B(τ) is given in Eq. (2.67). Then the state of the output modes aA′E′1E′2B′b has a
CM
VaA′E′1E′2B′b = S1(τA, τB)VaAE1E2BbS1(τA, τB)
T . (5.6)
Then a balanced beam splitter action is applied on modes A′ and B′ . Thus we reorder-
ing the modes in the previous CM obtaining the CM VabA′B′E1E2 and then apply the
symplectic transformation
S2 = I⊕ I⊕B(1/2)⊕ I (5.7)
from which we obtain
VabA′′B′′E1E2 = S2VabA′B′E1E2S
T
2 . (5.8)
We eliminate modes E1 and E2 from the previous CM and apply two conjugate homodyne
detections on modes A′′ and B′′ given in Eq. (2.71) accounting for the Bell detection in
the relay. This leads to a CM
Vab|γ =
µI 0
0 µI
− (µ2 − 1)×
×

τA/θ 0 −√τAτB/θ 0
0 τA/θ
′ 0
√
τAτB/θ
′
−√τAτB/θ 0 τB/θ 0
0
√
τAτB/θ
′ 0 τB/θ′
 (5.9)
with
θ = (τA + τB)µ+ λ and θ
′ = (τA + τB)µ+ λ′, (5.10)
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where
λ =(1− τA)ωA + (1− τB)ωB − 2g
√
(1− τA)(1− τB), (5.11)
λ′ =(1− τA)ωA + (1− τB)ωB + 2g′
√
(1− τA)(1− τB). (5.12)
Subsequently, we reorder the modes of the previous CM obtaining Vba|γ and we apply
a heterodyne measurement as in Eq. (2.72) in order to calculate the conditional CM on
Alice’s variable
Vb|γα˜ =
µ− µ2−1τA+τBµ+λ 0
0 µ− µ2−1τA+τBµ+λ′
 (5.13)
A more detailed calculation of the previous covariance matrices is found in the Supple-
mental Material of Ref. [29].
5.3 Secret key rate
The mutual information between Alice and Bob are dependant on both the quadratures
which have been modulated independently. Thus we have that
I(qα˜, pα˜, qβ˜, pβ˜|γ) =
1
2
log2
Vqβ˜|γ
Vqβ˜|γα˜
+
1
2
log2
Vpβ˜|γ
Vpβ˜|γα˜
=
1
2
log2
1
2(Vqb|γ + 1)
1
2(Vqb|γα˜ + 1)
+
1
2
log2
1
2(Vpb|γ + 1)
1
2(Vpb|γα˜ + 1)
=
=
1
2
log2
Vqb|γ + 1
Vqb|γα˜ + 1
+
1
2
log2
Vpb|γ + 1
Vpb|γα˜ + 1
=
1
2
log2Σ. (5.14)
The first equality holds because the variables are Gaussian (see Eq. (2.76)) while the second
emerges from the fact that the previous variables are outcomes of a heterodyne detection
of the corresponding modes with variances given by Vab|γ and Σ =
1+detVb|γ+TrVb|γ
1+detVb|γα˜+TrVb|γα˜
.
The Holevo function is calculated by
χ(E1E2 : α˜|γ) = S(ρE1E2|γ)− S(ρE1E2|γα˜) (5.15)
Since Eve holds a purification of Alice and Bob (see remark after Def. 2.6.3) and the
measurements applied for obtaining the conditional states are rank-one operations, the
following relations should hold
S(ρE1E2|γ) = S(ρab|γ) and S(ρE1E2|γα˜) = S(ρb|γa˜). (5.16)
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Figure 5.2: parties prepare coherent states in the modes A, B and C whose mean values are
Gaussian variables x1, x2 and x3, with variance VM . Then the parties send these states to the
relay using channels with transmissivities ηA, ηB and ηC respectively.After traveling through the
channels the modes arrive at the relay as modes A′, B′ and C ′ and processed by the relay. Although
the relay is under the full control of the eavesdropper, we can assume without loss of generality that
it operates consistently in each use of the channel: (a) firstly it mixes Alice’s and Bob’s modes in a
beam splitter with transmissivity 1/2 and measures the q-quadrature of mode R−1 with a homodyne
detection, (b) subsequently mixes Charlie’s mode with R+1 and then measures the q-quadrature and
p-quadrature of modes R−2 and R
+
2 respectively, (c) finally the results of the measurements γ1, γ2
and γ3 are broadcast. Any general attack affecting both the channels and the relay can be reduced
to an attack tampering only with the channels. In this case, Eve is injecting thermal noise ω1, ω2
and ω3 in each of the channels by means of the modes EA, EB and EC interacting with modes
A, B, C. In a general Gaussian attack, Eve’s modes are described by a correlated Gaussian state
whose CM is specified in Eq. (5.18). The scheme is described in more detail in the Supplementary
Information of Ref. [33].
This allows us to calculate the Holevo information to based only on the covariance matrices
Vab|γ and Vb|γα˜ and more specifically on their symplectic spectra (see Eq. (2.78)).
The secret key rate now is a function of the channel parameters such as transmissivity
τ , the attack parameters ωA, ωB, g, g
′ quantifying the channel thermal noise and the
modulation variance µ = VM + 1 as well as the reconciliation efficiency ξ so that the
relation of the secret key rate corresponding to that of Eq. (3.45) is expressed as follows
R(ξ, µ, τA, τB, ωA, ωB, g, g
′) = ξIAB − IE , (5.17)
where IAB is the mutual information from Eq. (5.14) and the Holevo information IE is
87
Chapter 5: Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
taken from Eq. (5.15). We have plotted the secret key rate for symmetric and asymmetric
configuration in Fig. 8.1.
5.4 CV-MDI-QKD three-user network
In the three-user setting we assume three users Alice, Bob and Charlie using an interme-
diate relay in order to extract a common secret key. Each one prepares in a mode A, B
and C respectively in a coherent state with amplitude modulated by the Gaussian random
variables x1, x2, and x3 with the same variance Vm. These modes propagate through three
channels described by lossy channels with transmissivities τA, τB and τC respectively and
arrive to the relay as illustrated in Fig. 5.2. In each channel use, the relay is assumed
to operate according to a certain way. Firstly, it mixes Alice’s and Bob’s modes in a
beam splitter with transmissivity τ1 = 1/2. Then it homodynes the output mode R
−
1 with
respect the q quadrature. On the other hand, mode R+1 is mixed with Charlie’s mode in
a beam splitter with transmissivity τ2 = 2/3. Subsequently, the output modes R
−
2 and
R+2 are conjugately homodyned. All the measurement outcomes γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3) are then
broadcast. Afterwards, the distributed classical correlations can be processed by the three
parties to extract a common secret key for secure quantum conferencing Ref. [32,33]. The
scheme is generalized for N number of users and described in detail in the Supplemental
Information of Ref. [33] along with the previous multi-mode Bell-detection.
Any attack that may include a relay that does not work as described above [29] can
be broken to an attack on the channels plus a proper working relay. More specifically, the
correlated attack among all the three channels can be described by the CM
VEAEBEC =

ωAI G1 G3
G1 ωBI G2
G3 G2 ωCI
 , (5.18)
where ωA, ωB and ωC is the noise injected by the eavesdropper in each channel respectively.
In addition, Gi = diag(gi, g
′
i) describes the correlations between the modes. When gi and
g′i are equal to zero, the attack is reduced to an uncorrelated attack, which is the case that
we investigate in this study.
In terms of the security analysis, we assume that the modes A, B and C are each one
half of an TMSV state with parameter µ = VM + 1 (entanglement based representation).
Heterodyne measurements are applied to the local TMSV modes a, b, and c so that the
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Figure 5.3: Secret conferencing key rate versus η for the three-party star configuration protocol
based on the CV-MDI-QKD scheme, optimized over µ.
traveling modes are projected onto modulated coherent states. In this representation,
Eve’s Holevo bound IE is given by the symplectic eigenvalues of the CM Vabc|γ of Eve’s
average state and the conditional state CM Vbc|γ,x1 following the reasoning in Sec. 5.3.
More specifically, the total CM is given by the CM of the parties’ local modes after the
application of the three relay measurements with outcome γ. Since we assume reconcilia-
tion over Alice’s variable the conditional CM is derived by the total CM after applying a
heterodyne detection on mode a. The explicit expressions are found in Ref. [32].
The mutual information in the case of the three parties is defined as the minimum of
the mutual information between Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie, i.e., Imin = min{IAB, IAC}.
Each of the terms are evaluated by the formula IAB(C) =
1
2 log2Σb(c), where we have the
following (for m = b or c)
Σm =
det(Vm|γ) + tr(Vm|γ) + 1
det(Vm|γ,x1) + tr(Vm|γ,x1) + 1
, (5.19)
in terms of the covariance matrices of the local mode m.
As a result, the secret conferencing key rate is given by
R(µ,ω,η) = ξImin(µ,ω,η)− IE(µ,ω,η), (5.20)
where ω = (ωA, ωB, ωC) is the vector of the noise injected by the eavesdropper in each
channel with corresponding transmissivity η = (ηA, ηB, ηC). Numerically, we have checked
that, even for ideal reconciliation ξ = 1, the largest value of µ is not the optimal and we
have therefore to optimize the rate over µ.
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Note that an asymmetric scenario where all the transmissivities and noises are different
can be reduced to a symmetric scenario where we consider the lowest transmissivity and
the highest noise for all the channels. This clearly gives a lower bound to the achievable
key rate. In such a star configuration with identical channels the previous rate simplifies
to
Rstar(µ, ω, η) = ξImin(µ, ω, η)− IE(µ, ω, η), (5.21)
where ηA = ηB = ηC := η and ωA = ωB = ωC := ω. This is plotted in Fig. 5.3 for passive
eavesdropping (ω = 1).
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the MDI protocol, where the two parties encode their vari-
ables to coherent states and send them to a central relay. The relay applies joint measure-
ments to the aforementioned modes and broadcasts the outcome. The parties correlate
their variables using the measurement outcomes of a central relay. This protects their
communication from side-channel attacks on the detection apparatus. Due to the pres-
ence of the relay, the protocols configuration can be the basis for network settings with
multiple users.
In the following chapters, we are going to present a security analysis incorporating
finite-size effects and a composable security analysis assuming coherent attacks for the two-
user CV-MDI scheme. Afterwards, we are going to extend the asymptotic security analysis
of a three user instance of the multi-party CV-MDI scheme for the star configuration
assuming fast fading channels with uniform distribution.
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Finite-size effects
6.1 Introduction
In the previous discussion we considered the case of the asymptotic secret key rate, i.e.
assuming an infinite number of channel uses. This is the first approach that someone
should adopt in order to assess the security of a protocol in the sense that if there is no
security for an infinite number of signal exchange, there is no need to investigate the more
realistic case of a finite exchange of signals.
Then the secret key rate in this case is modified in order to include the changes due
to the previous assumption. These modifications are called finite-size effects and in gen-
eral deteriorate the performance of a protocol. This is expected since these assumptions
simulate realistic conditions and drive the investigation of the performance of a protocol
away from an idealistic description as this of an infinite signal exchange between the hon-
est parties. This deterioration is connected to the the number of signal states used for
the communication between the honest parties. As this number is increasing and tending
towards infinity, this decline disappears and one obtains the protocol performance of the
asymptotic case.
6.2 Non-asymptotic security analysis
The secret key rate incorporating finite-size effects was firstly calculated in Ref. [53] and
for the continuous variables protocol it turns out to be [54]
K =
n
n+m
(
ξI˜AB − I˜E −∆(n)
)
. (6.1)
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The quantities I˜AB and I˜E are the same as for the asymptotic key rate (see Eq. (3.44)),
namely the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob and the Holevo informa-
tion for Eve’s system on Alice’s or Bob’s variable depending on the reconciliation direction.
However, there is a difference in the calculation of these quantities since they are depen-
dent on the channel parameter estimation process which becomes relevant in the finite-size
regime.
This is because the channel parameters, transmissivity τ and excess noise variance
Vϵ = (τ − 1)(ω − 1) (see entangling cloner attack in Sec. (2.5.1.1)), are not known and
have to be estimated by sacrificing part of the signal states. In particular, part of the
signal states is used for this estimation and has to be revealed and does not contribute
to the secret key extraction (see Fig. (6.1)). By this process, Alice and Bob constrain
the uncertainty of the channel parameters and thus can provide with a tighter bound for
Eve’s knowledge on their variables. This is in contrast with the asymptotic case, where
Figure 6.1: This figure shows the procedure of channel parameter estimation. From a block of N¯
signals states send through the channel Alice and Bob chose randomly and reveal the measurement
outcomes of m of them. These contribute to the channel parameter estimation, i.e., to statistically
create confidence intervals for parameters such as the transmissivity τ and the excess noise variance
Vϵ. The rest n are not revealed and contribute to the extraction of the secret key. As m increases
the channel parameters are estimated more accurately and this results to a calculation of a tighter
bound for the secret key rate meaning that the parties will end up with a larger key for a given
number of n states via the privacy amplification. On the other hand, if N¯ is fixed, larger m means
smaller n that results in a smaller key. In order to find the balance for this trade off we have to
optimize over the ratio r = m/N¯ .
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in principle there is an infinite number of signals for the channel parameter estimation
implying that the honest parties know the channel parameters with certainty.
In the finite-size effects regime, it is important that a balance exists between the number
of signals used for key extraction and the channel parameter estimation. As m increases
the channel parameters are estimated more accurately and this results to a calculation of
a tighter bound for the secret key rate meaning that the parties will end up with a larger
key for a given number of n states via the privacy amplification. On the other hand, if N¯
is fixed, larger m means smaller n that results in a smaller key. An analysis taking into
account this fact was presented in Ref. [15]. Here we give a summary of this study and in
the following chapters of this thesis we modify it in an analogous so as to be suitable for
other protocols.
In order to see the effect of the parameter estimation, we assumem realizations of signal
states that their measurement outcomes will be used in the channel parameter estimation.
These outcomes follow Gaussian distributions since the protocols in discussion are the
fully Gaussian one-way protocols (see Chap. 3) and the attack is the entangling cloner
attack. These outcomes can be considered as samples from which we can define maximum
likelihood estimators for the parameters of interest. For these estimators, we calculate
their mean and variance and obtain confidence intervals for them. From these intervals,
we choose the values that have the largest negative effect on the secret key rate, which
accounts the for the worst case scenario for Alice and Bob in terms of security.
Furthermore, the relation of the secret key rate with finite size effects takes into con-
sideration the fact that the Holevo information function is not working correctly in a finite
size effects regime. Thus, there is an extra term that accounts for this correction, which
is dependent on the number of signals used for key extraction. As presented in Ref. [14],
this term is approximately calculated to be
∆(n) ∼ (2× 2d + 3)
√
log2(2/ϵsm)
n
, (6.2)
where ϵsm is the smoothing parameter that has to do with the use of Holevo information
in an non-asymptotic analysis, and d is the discretization parameter corresponding to 2d
intervals used by the parties to discretize their variables. In the most cases, we assume
that the key is given in terms of bits and set d = 1. In theory, the parameter ϵsm is assumed
to be optimized for maximizing the rate. However, this makes a negligible difference and
thus we set it to be approximately 10−10. In the following section, we give the explicit
steps for the channel parameter estimation.
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6.3 Channel parameter estimation
In order to achieve the channel parameter estimation we first describe the channel output
variable in terms of signal and noise
y =
√
τx+ z,
where τ is the transmissivity of the channel x is the variable describing the signal and z
the variable describing the noise. Both variables are independent and in our case follow
Gaussian distributions. In fact, the actual relation is given by equation Eq. (3.11), where
have we set y → QB, x → QM and z → QN . Then we can define estimators for the
covariance of the signal variable x with the channel output variable y and the variance
of the variable z = y − √τx. We then use these estimators to define estimators for the
transmissivity and the variance of the excess noise.
6.3.1 Variance of the transmissivity
Let us assume m realizations of the Alice’s variable QM denoted byMi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
These correspond to m realization of Bob’s quadrature variable QB given in Eq.(3.11).
Both QM and QB follow normal distributions with variances VM and VB and zero mean
and can be seen as members of a bivariate normal distribution. Thus, we can define the
maximum likelihood estimator [51] of the covariance Cov(QM , QB) =
√
τVM := CMB with
the help of the previous realizations by
C˜MB =
1
m
m∑
i=1
MiBi (6.3)
This estimator is normally distributed as the sample mean of the variableQMQB according
to the central limit theorem. Its mean value is
E(C˜MB) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
E(MiBi) = E(QM , QB) =
√
τVM = CMB (6.4)
where the second equality holds because each of the realizations Mi (Bi) follows the same
distribution as QM (QB). The variance of the estimator is given by
Var(C˜MB) =
1
m2
m∑
i=1
Var(E(MiBi)) =
1
m
Var(QM QˆB) (6.5)
=
1
m
Var(QM , QB) =
1
m
(2τV 2M + VMVN ) := VCMB , (6.6)
where we have replaced QB and used the moments of the Gaussian distribution.
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The relation
√
τVM := CMB can also be expressed as
τ =
1
V 2M
(CMB)
2. (6.7)
We assume that the variance VM is known to the parties since it describes Alice’s state
preparation and thus we only replace with the estimators of τ and CMB in order to obtain
an expression for the estimator of τ given by
τ˜ =
1
VM
(C˜MB)
2 =
VCMB
V 2M
(
C˜MB√
VCMB
)2
. (6.8)
From this equation, we can calculate the variance and the mean value of the transmis-
sivity estimator by using the fact that C˜MB√
VCMB
is following a standard normal distribution.
According to Eq. (A.3.4), this means that its square is chi-squared distributed(
C˜MB√
VCMB
)2
∼ χ2
(
1,
C2MB
VCMB
)
(6.9)
with mean (1+
C2MB
VCMB
) and variance 2(1+2
C2MB
VCMB
). In fact, for very large m >> 1 we have
that VCMB << 1. Therefore
C2MB
VCMB
>> 1 implying that the previous distribution can be
approximated by a normal distribution with the same variance and mean (see Remark in
Appendix A). Then we calculate that
E(τ˜) = τ +O(1/m) (6.10)
and
Var(τ˜) =
4
m
τ2(2 +
VN
τVM
) +O(1/m2) := σ2. (6.11)
6.3.2 Variance of the excess noise variance
We can have a maximum likelihood estimator for the noise variance VN of QN = QB −
√
τQM associated with realizations Bi −
√
τ˜Mi. This estimator is given by
V˜N =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Bi −
√
τ˜Mi)
2 (6.12)
According to Eq. (3.15), we have the estimator for Vϵ
V˜ϵ = V˜N − 1 (6.13)
The uncertainty of this estimator consists of two levels of uncertainty. The first one and
most important is created from the realizations Bi and Mi. The second is created due
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to the variable
√
τ˜ , which in principle has to be replaced from Eq.(6.8). However, here
we replace the variable
√
τ˜ with
√
τ since we assume its uncertainty is negligible. This
is justified by the fact that for large values of m the variance σ2 vanishes. Therefore we
obtain
E(V˜ϵ) =E
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Bi −
√
τMi)
2 − 1
)
(6.14)
where we have that
∑m
i=1(
Bi−
√
τMi√
VN
)2 is chi-squared distributed with mean m and variance
2m as the sum of squares of random variables follow the standard normal distribution (see
Eq. A.3.4). Therefore we have that the mean value is given by
E(V˜ϵ) =E
(
VN
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τMi√
VN
)2
− 1
)
(6.15)
=VN − 1 = Vϵ (6.16)
while the variance is
Var(V˜ϵ) =Var
(
VN
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τMi√
VN
)2
− 1
)
=
2
m
V 2N := s
2. (6.17)
6.4 Secret key rate with finite size effects
Using Eq. (A.4.7), we then calculate the confidence intervals of the estimators
τ˜ = {τ − 6.5σ, τ + 6.5σ}, V˜ϵ = {Vϵ − 6.5s, Vϵ + 6.5s}, (6.18)
given that the error is ∼ 10−10. The worst case scenario is satisfied by using the values
τ low = τ − 6.5σ, and V upϵ = Vϵ + 6.5s. (6.19)
Then we express the secret key rate function of Eq. (3.45) as
R(ξ, VM , τ, Vϵ) = ξIAB − IE , (6.20)
where we have set Vϵ = τϵ and ϵ =
(1−τ)(ω−1)
τ and we replace with Vϵ → V upϵ and τ → τ low
so that the secret key rate with channel estimated parameters to be
R˜(ξ, VM , τ, Vϵ,m) = R(ξ, VM , τ
low, V upϵ ) = ξI˜AB − I˜E . (6.21)
The secret key rate with finite size effects is given by replacing the the asymptotic key
rate with estimated channel parameters of Eq. (6.21) into Eq. (6.1)
K =
n
n+m
(
R˜(ξ, VM , τ, Vϵ,m)−∆(n)
)
(6.22)
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and if N¯ = n+m and r = m/N¯ , then
K = (1− r)
(
R˜(ξ, VM , τ, Vϵ, rN¯)−∆((1− r)N¯)
)
(6.23)
so that for a given block size number N¯ we can optimized over the ratio r.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarized the procedure of channel parameter estimation for some
of the fully Gaussian protocols. This method is based on the Central Limit Theorem and
on the Gaussian nature of the variables describing the given protocol and applies changes
to the asymptotic key rate in order to include finite-size effects. We are going to modify
it appropriately and used it for the non-asymptotic security analysis of the CV-MDI and
thermal state protocols presented in the following chapters.
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Chapter 7
Finite-size security analysis for
one-way protocols using thermal
states
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present results from Ref. [26] about the secret key rate of the protocols
using normally distributed thermal states (see Chap. 4) incorporating finite-size effects by
modifying appropriately the method of Ref. [15] summarized in Chap 6. We constrain our
study in the protocol with direct reconciliation and homodyne detection since this is the
most robust in terms of additional thermal trusted noise during Alice’s state preparation
(see Fig. 4.6). We then study of the finite-size secret key rate for different trusted thermal
noise variances with respect to the block size needed for having a performance close to
the asymptotic one. Finally, we connect the secret key rate with the frequency of the
electromagnetic filed in order to investigate the behaviour of the protocol in the microwave
regime with respect different block sizes.
7.2 Channel parameter estimation
For the channel parameter estimation, we use the maximum likelihood estimator of the
covariance of QM and QB (see Eq. (6.3)) to obtain the estimator for transmissivity τ˜ .
Subsequently, we use a maximum likelihood estimator for the variance of the variable
QN = QB −
√
τQM (see Eq.(6.12)) for an the estimator of the excess noise variance Vϵ.
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Both of them are calculated by assuming m realizations Mi and Bi of Alice’s and Bob’s
variables, where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Each of the realizations Mi (Bi) are following the same
normal distribution as QM (QB) with given modulation variance VM
7.2.1 Variance of the transmissivity estimator
The definition of the estimator of covariance σMB = Cov(QMQB), between variables QM
and QB, is then easy to define as follows
σ˜MB =
1
m
m∑
i=1
MiBi. (7.1)
From Eq. (7.1) we can compute both the expectation value and variance of σ˜MB. This is
done by assumingMi and Bi are independent and normally distributed Gaussian variables.
Therefore, we obtain the expectation value
E [σ˜MB] =
√
τVM = σMB, (7.2)
and the variance
Vσ˜MB =
τV 2M
m
(
2 +
VN
τVM
)
. (7.3)
According to Eq. (7.2), we can obtain the expectation value and variance of the esti-
mator, of the transmissivity
τ˜ =
σ˜2MB
V 2M
=
Vσ˜MB
V 2M
(
σ˜MB√
VσˆMB
)2
, (7.4)
where (
σ˜MB√
Vσ˜MB
)2
∼ χ2(1, σ
2
MB
Vσ˜MB
)
is chi-squared distributed with mean (1+
σ2MB
Vσ˜MB
) and variance 2(1+2
σ2MB
Vσ˜MB
) (see Eq. (A.3.4)).
Note that for m >> 1 the variance Vσ˜MB << 1, which implies that the parameter
λ =
σ2MB
Vσ˜MB
>> 1. Therefore, according to the remark in Appendix A, this distribu-
tion can be approximated by a normal distribution with the same mean and variance.
Eq. (7.4) allows us to compute the following expectation value
E [τ˜ ] =
Vσ˜MB
V 2M
E
( σ˜MB√
Vσ˜MB
)2 = τ +O(1/m), (7.5)
and variance
σ2τ˜ =
4τ2
m
(
2 +
VN
τVM
)
+O(1/m2). (7.6)
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7.2.2 Variance of the excess noise variance estimator
We follow the same steps in order to obtain the variance VN starting from the statistical
sampling Bi and Mi. Using the relations QN = QB −
√
τQM , we can write the estimator
of VN as follows
V˜N =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τˆMi
)2
. (7.7)
Eq. (7.5) and Eq. (7.6) imply that the standard deviation στ˜ becomes rapidly negligible as
m≫ 1. For reasons of simplicity, one can then securely substitute the estimator τ˜ with its
actual value τ in Eq. (7.7) since we can assume that the main source of uncertainty stems
only from Bi and Mi. Note that variable Bi−
√
τMi is normally distributed with variance
VN , which means that
∑m
i=1
(
Bi−
√
τMi√
VN
)2
is also χ2-distributed with expectation values m
and variance 2m (see Eq. (A.3.4)). For degrees of freedom m >> 1, this distribution can
be approximated by a normal distribution with the same mean and variance. Thus we
can write
V˜N =
VN
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τMi√
VN
)2
.
The estimator for the variance Vε, can now be expressed using Eq. (4.14) leading to the
following formula
V˜ε = V˜N − τ˜Vth − 1,
with expectation value
E(V˜ε) = VN − τVth − 1, (7.8)
and variance
σ2
V˜ε
=
2V 2N
m
+ V 2thσ
2
τ˜ . (7.9)
We note that these equations are similar to the corresponding ones from Chap 6. The only
but crucial difference in this case is the contribution of thermal noise Vth in VN . This has
as a result an extra term to appear in Eq. (7.9) which is dependent on the variance of τ˜
as well.
7.3 Secret key rate with finite size effects
Assuming an error probability for the parameter estimation of the order of εPE = 10
−10
and using Eq. (A.4.7) the corresponding confidence intervals of channel parameters are
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Figure 7.1: (Color online) This figure focuses on the key-rate in the optical regime. The left
panel describes the key rate versus channel attenuation given in dB. The red solid curve describes
the ideal key-rate, using just coherent states. The blue-dashed curve describes the ideal key rate
assuming a preparation noise with variance Vth = 9 SNU. Then, we keep the same Vth and plot
the finite-size rate for block size with N¯ = 109 (black dashed line) and N¯ = 107 (gray dashed) with
ξ = 0.98 and ω = 1. The key rate is optimized over the Gaussian modulation VM . The right panel
presents the key rate as a function of the block size (N¯). We fix channel attenuation to 1 dB, and
we assume pure loss attack ω = 1 while ξ = 0.98. The plot shows the convergence of the key rates
toward the asymptotic values (dashed curves) for different values of the preparation noise Vth =
0, 1, 10, 100, 150 SNU, from top to bottom.
given by
τ˜ ={τ − 6.5στ˜ , τ + 6.5στ˜}, (7.10)
V˜ε ={Vε − 6.5σV˜ε , Vε + 6.5σV˜ε} (7.11)
from which the worst case scenario parameter values are chosen
τ low := τ − 6.5στ˜ , V upε := Vε + 6.5σV˜ε . (7.12)
The quantities in Eq. (7.12) are then used to compute the finite-size key rate, which is
given by the following expression
K =
n
N¯
[
R˜(ξ, VM , Vth, V
up
ε , τ
low)−∆
]
, (7.13)
where N¯ = n+m, is the total number of signals points, n is the number of signals used to
build the key, and the correction term ∆(n, d) given in Eq. (6.2) accounts for the penalty
for using the Holevo bound in the key rate of Eq. (7.13) using a finite number of signals.
104
7.3 Secret key rate with finite size effects
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Transmissivity τ
1011
1012
1013
1014
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
 f 
(H
z)
N¯ = 10
9
N¯ = ∞
N¯ = 10
6
Figure 7.2: (Color online) The red line shows the security threshold (frequencies vs channel’s
transmissivity) for a shot-noise level attack ω = Vth + 1 without finite-size effects, and assuming
infinite Gaussian modulation. Then we have the case for block size with N¯ = 106 signal points
(black) and N¯ = 109 (blue).
Here, we assume that d = 4 since thermal states are using a larger phase-space so that we
should have a more refined discretization. The secret key rate R˜ comes from the asymptotic
key rate of Eq.(4.44) by expressing it with respect the parameter Vϵ = (1 − τ)(ω − 1).
Then we set the values of V upε and τ low computed previously.
By virtue of Eq. (7.13), we quantifying relevant quantities like achievable distance and
block-size needed to obtain a positive secret key rate. More specifically, we concentrate on
the size of the signal blocks needed in order to achieve a positive key rate as the thermal
noise is increasing. By using Vε = τε, with ε = [(1− τ)(ω − 1)] /τ for ω being the variance
of thermal noise of Eve’s ancillary states used in the attack, we express the key rate as
follows
K ′ = (1− r)
[
R˜′(ξ, VM , Vth, ω, dB, r, N¯)−∆
]
, (7.14)
where the transmissivity τ is given in terms of dB of attenuation by using τ = 10−
dB
10
and r := m/N¯ . The asymptotic key rate R˜′ is given by the corresponding key rate R˜ of
Eq. (7.13), where we have made the previous replacements. From Eq. (7.14) we can plot
the key rate as a function of the channel attenuation, fixing the values of Vth, reconciliation
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efficiency ξ, thermal noise ω. Then we can optimize over the remaining parameters.
The results for pure-loss attacks are shown in Fig. 7.1. In the left panel, we plot the
key rate for different values of the block-size and preparation noise. In particular, the red
solid line describes the asymptotic key rate when Alice send coherent states, i.e., Vth = 0,
while the blue-dashed line is for Vth = 9 SNU. Then, we compare the previous curves with
the key rate of Eq. (7.14) for N¯ = 109 (black dashed line) and N¯ = 107 (gray dashed
line). In Fig. 7.1 (right panel), we quantify the block-size needed to achieve a positive
key rate for increasing values of the preparation noise. We fix the attenuation to 1 dB
and assume pure loss attack (ω = 1 SNU). We then plot the key-rate as a function of
the block-size, for preparation noise Vth = 0, 1, 10, 100, 150 SNU from top to bottom
and efficiency ξ = 0.98 [62]. Our results show that, by an increase in Vth, the block-size
need to be increased in order to match the asymptotic value of the key rate (dashed lines).
This stems from the fact that the confidence intervals are dependent on Alice’s thermal
noise as for large amount of Vth they widen resulting in estimating lower transmissivity
and higher channel thermal noise.
7.4 Secret key rate in different frequencies
Here we follow the reasoning of Sec. 4.4 and we set for Eve’s thermal variance in here
ancillary modes ω = Vth + 1 and Vth = 2n¯, where n¯ is taken from Eq. (4.45) for room
temperature T = 300K, in the rate of Eq. (7.13). Then we can plot the corresponding
thresholds, illustrated in Fig. 7.2, in terms of frequency versus transmissivity for different
block sizes. We see that in the microwave region security is achieved only for transmissiv-
ities very close to τ = 1 for a moderately high block size number of N = 109. Note that
the rapid decrease of the protocols performance due to the additional preparation noise
affecting the channel parameter estimated values is now deteriorating due to considering
an entangling cloner attack even in the shot-noise level which is as high as the preparation
noise.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we expanded the a non-asymptotic secret key rate analysis to the one-way
protocols using thermal states. This extra trusted noise in Alice’s preparation allows us
to investigate the performance of such a protocol in the microwave regime. The context of
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this analysis was focused on the parameter estimation step based on Gaussian distribution
assumption and on the central limit theorem. We notice that the estimated values of the
channel parameters are dependent on the presence of the preparation noise, which as it
increases gives a more pessimistic secret key rate. This reflects on the limitations of this
protocol in terms of using a small block size as Alice’s thermal noise is increasing for
achieving key rates near to the asymptotic ones.
As a later step, we would like to investigate a protocol of thermal states using a discrete
modulation instead of a Gaussian (see Sec. 3.6). Also protocols with post selection or two-
way communication might be more appropriate of handling the extra preparation noise.
It would be interesting to proceed with their non-asymptotic analysis comparing their
robustness in terms of high preparation noise with respect block size.
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Chapter 8
Finite-size security analysis for
CV-MDI-QKD
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present the work of Ref. [34]. We base our finite size analysis in
Chap. 6, where we have seen that such an analysis is based on the asymptotic secret key
rate calculation (see Chap. 5). We assume a two-mode Gaussian attack equivalent to the
entangling cloner attack of the conventional one-way protocols. Our statistical estimation
of the channel parameters is assuming a Gaussian framework and is based on the central
limit theorem. We start with separating the signal and noise variables of the relay outputs
and use these variables in order to estimate the channel parameters and create confidence
intervals for them. Then we choose the most pessimistic values of the intervals for these
parameters so as to simulate the worst case scenario for our security analysis. We finally
use these values in the function of the secret key rate incorporating finite size effects in
order to evaluate the performance of the CV-MDI protocol in a more realistic situation.
We notice then that, as we increase the block size, the protocol achieves a performance
closer to the asymptotic one as it was expected. In addition to this, block sizes in the
range of 106−109 can produce a secret key rate of about 10−2 bit/use even when the excess
noise is as high as 0.01 vacuum shot noise units (SNU) for an attenuation compatible with
metropolitan distances when using standard optical-fibre equipment.
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8.2 Relay outputs: losses and excess noise
The output variables of the relay are denoted with QR := q− and PR = p+, where the
output γ = q− + ip+ and are dependent on the evolution of Alice’s and Bob’s traveling
modes A and B with quadratures α = (QA, PA) and β = (QB, PB). In terms of these
input field quadratures, one can then write the following relations
QR =
1√
2
(
√
τB(QM,B +Q0,B)−√τA(QM,A +Q0,A))
+
1√
2
(
√
1− τBQE2 −
√
1− τAQE1)
=
1√
2
(
√
τB(QM,B −√τAQM,A) +QN , (8.1)
PR =
1√
2
(
√
τB(PM,B + P0,B) +
√
τA(PM,A + P0,A))
+
1√
2
(
√
1− τBPE2 +
√
1− τAPE1)
=
1√
2
(
√
τB(PM,B −√τAPM,A) + PN , (8.2)
where
QN =
1√
2
(
√
τBQ0,B −√τAQ0,A) + 1√
2
(
√
1− τBQE2 −
√
1− τAQE1), (8.3)
PN =
1√
2
(
√
τBP0,B +
√
τAP0,A) +
1√
2
(
√
1− τBPE2 +
√
1− τAPE1), (8.4)
with QN and QN are noise terms accounting for both excess noise and quantum shot noise
coming form the signal modes as well as Eve’s ancillary modes. Their variances are given
by
VQN = 1 + VQ,ϵ, VPN = 1 + VP,ϵ, (8.5)
with
VQ,ϵ = k − gu, VP,ϵ = k + g′u, (8.6)
and
k =
(1− τB)(ωB − 1) + (1− τA)(ωA − 1)
2
, (8.7)
u =
√
(1− τB)(1− τA), (8.8)
where g and g′ have been defined in Eq. (5.3). Therefore, we can express the variances of
QR and PR in terms of signal and noise
VQR =
1
2
(τB + τA)VM + VQN , (8.9)
VPR =
1
2
(τB + τA)VM + VPN . (8.10)
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8.3 Channel parameter estimation
8.3.1 Variance of the transmissivity
The parameters estimation procedure is described in more detail as follows: Alice’s and
Bob’s Gaussian modulation VM is assumed to be a known parameter while the channel
parameters transmissivity τA, τB and variance of the excess noises VQ,ϵ and VQ,ϵ need to
be estimated and confidence intervals to be defined for them. Assuming that m Gaussian
distributed signals are used for this task, we associate to AQ,i (AP,i) and BQ,i (BP,i),
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the empirical realizations of the field quadrature of the traveling
modes. By contrast, we denote by RQ,i and RP,i the realizations of the relay outputs. We
first present the procedure for output QR of the relay. From Eq. (8.1) one can write the
estimator of transmissivity τA as follows
τ˜AQ =
2
V 2M
C˜2ARQ ,
where the covariance CARq = Cov(QM,AQR) =
√
τA/2VM has maximum likelihood esti-
mator given by
C˜ARQ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
AQ,iRQ,i,
normally distributed as the sample mean of variable Z = QM,AQR. We can compute the
expectation value by
E(C˜ARQ) = E(QM,AQR) =
√
τA
2
VM = CARQ , (8.11)
and the variance can be defined as
VCov := Var(C˜ARQ) (8.12)
with
Var(C˜ARQ) =
1
m
Var(QM,AQR) =
=
1
2m
[
τAVar(Q
2
M,A) + τBVar(QM,AQM,B)
]
+Var(QM,AQN ), (8.13)
=
1
m
(
τAV
2
M +
τB
2
V 2M + VMVQN
)
=
1
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)
V 2M
[
1 +
VQN(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
, (8.14)
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where we have considered the independence of the variables and the second order moments
of the normal distribution.
Therefore, we can derive the mean and variance for the estimator of τA. We rewrite
the estimator as
τ˜AQ =
2VCov
V 2M
(
C˜ARQ√
VCov
)2
. (8.15)
Note that the variable
(
C˜ARQ/
√
VCov
)2
is χ2−distributed (see Eq.(A.3.4)), i.e.,(
C˜ARQ√
VCov
)2
∼ χ2
[
1,
(
CARQ√
VCov
)2]
, (8.16)
with expectation value
E
( C˜ARQ√
VCov
)2 = 1 + ( CARQ√
VCov
)2
, (8.17)
and variance
Var
( C˜ARQ√
VCov
)2 = 2[1 + 2( CARQ√
VCov
)2]
. (8.18)
Form >> 1, this distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution with the same
variance and mean since then VCov << 1 and
[
CARQ√
VCov
]2
>> 1 (see remark in Appendix A).
The expectation value of τ˜AQ is then given by
E(τ˜AQ) =
2VCov
V 2M
[
1 +
(
CARQ√
VCov
)2]
=
=
2C2ARQ
V 2M
+O(1/m) = τA +O(1/m) (8.19)
and its variance is
Var(τ˜AQ) =
4V 2Cov
V 4M
2
[
1 + 2
(
CARQ√
VCov
)2]
=
=
16VCovC
2
ARQ
V 4M
+O(1/m2). (8.20)
By replacing from Eq. (8.11) and Eq. (8.14), we obtain
Var(τ˜AQ) =
16
mV 4M
(
τA +
τB
2
)
V 4MτA
2
[
1 +
VQN(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
+O(1/m2),
=
8τA
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1 +
VQN(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
+O(1/m2). (8.21)
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The estimator of the transmissivity τ˜AQ is only asymptotically unbiased. In fact the
standard deviation
√
Var(τ˜AQ) is of order 1/
√
m while the bias goes as 1/m. As we
consider m > 105 in our analysis, the value of the bias becomes rapidly negligible as
m≫ 1.
We also can have an estimator of τA considering the other output of the relay, PR as
well for which hold very similar relations. We can write the estimator of the covariance
CARP , which is given by
C˜ARP =
1
m
m∑
i=1
AP,iRP,i,
then using Eq. (8.2) one can write the estimator of the transmissivity τA
τ˜AP =
2
V 2M
C˜2ARP ,
having variance
Var(τ˜AP ) =
8
m
τA
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1 +
VPN(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
. (8.22)
We notice that it differs from the formula of Eq. (8.21) in the expression of VpN , given in
Eq. (8.5). Now, from Eq. (8.21) and Eq. (8.22) we calculate the optimum linear combina-
tion of the variances of the two estimators (see Eq.(A.5.11))
Var(τ˜A) =
Var(τ˜Aq)Var(τ˜Ap)
Var(τ˜Aq) + Var(τ˜Ap)
:= σ2A. (8.23)
The same steps can be performed to obtain the relevant estimators for transmissivity τB
and the corresponding variance Var(τ˜B) = σ
2
B.
8.3.2 Variance of the excess noise variance
The estimator of the variance of the excess noise VQ,ϵ present on the communication
channel estimator can be derived from the maximum likelihood estimator of VQ,N ,
V˜Q,ϵ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
RQ,i −
√
τ˜BBQ,i −
√
τ˜AAQ,i√
2
]2
− 1, (8.24)
We can replace the estimator of τA (τB) with its value as in Chap. 6 assuming that any
uncertainty in the estimator of the excess noise comes only from variables RQ,i, AQ,i and
BQ,i. We then have that the expression inside square brackets is normally distributed
with zero mean and variance Vq,N . In addition to this, one also has that the following
expression
Y :=
m∑
i=1
(
RQ,i −
(√
τBBQ,i −√τAAQ,i
)
/
√
2√
VQ,N
)2
∼ χ2(m, 0), (8.25)
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is χ2-distributed (see Eq. (A.3.4)), and has mean E(Y ) = m and variance Var(Y ) = 2m.
Note that for m >> 1 this distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution with
the same mean and variance see remark in (Appendix A). This allows to approximate
the sum of Eq. (8.24) with VQ,NY when we assume large values for m, obtaining the
expectation value
E(V˜Q,ϵ) ≈ 1
m
VQNE(Y )− 1 = VQ,ϵ (8.26)
and the variance
Var(V˜Q,ϵ) ≈ 1
m2
V 2QNVar(Y ) =
2
m
V 2QN := s
2
Q. (8.27)
Correspondingly, we obtain an estimator for VP,ϵ expressed as
V˜P,ϵ =
1
m
∑
i=1
[
RP,i − 1√
2
(
√
τ˜BBP,i +
√
τ˜AAP,i)
]2
− 1 (8.28)
and variance
Var(V˜P,ϵ) ≈ 2
m
V 2P,N := s
2
P . (8.29)
8.3.3 Secret key rate with finite size effects
Subsequently, from Eq. (8.27) and Eq. (8.29) we compute the confidence intervals from
Eq. (A.4.7) by assuming an error of 10−10 and select the pessimistic values given by the
following choice of parameters
τ lowA =τA − 6.5σA, τ lowB = τB − 6.5σB, (8.30)
V upq,ϵ =Vq,ϵ + 6.5sQ, V
up
p,ϵ = Vp,ϵ + 6.5sP . (8.31)
Once we have obtained the estimation of the transmissivities of the channels and the
corresponding excess noises, we write the secret key rate of Eq. (5.17) in terms of the
excess noise variances VQ,ϵ and VP,ϵ and replace with the relations of Eq. (8.30–8.30) and
VM = µ− 1 in order to obtain the asymptotic key rate with channel parameter estimated
values
R˜(ξ, VM , τ
low
A , τ
low
B , V
up
q,ϵ , V
up
p,ϵ , g, g
′). (8.32)
Then we use this rate into the relation of the secret key rate with finite size effects,
which yields
K =
n
N¯
(
R˜(ξ, VM , τ
low
A , τ
low
B , V
up
q,ϵ , V
up
p,ϵ )−∆(n)
)
, (8.33)
where n = N¯−m is the number of signals used to prepare the key and N¯ the total number
of signal exchanged.
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Figure 8.1: (Color online)The figure summarize the impact of finite size effects on the performance
of CV-MDI QKD for both asymmetric (panel a) and symmetric (panel b) configuration of the relay,
in the presence of optimal two-mode attack. In panel (a) the key rate is plotted as a function of
the dB of attenuation on Bob’s channel, with the relay placed near Alice τA = 0.98. From top to
bottom, the black curves describe: the rate for N¯ ≫ 1 with ξ = 0.98, and optimizing over VM (solid
line). Then we have the cases with finite block-size. The dashed line is for N¯ = 109 while the dot-
dashed curve is obtained for N¯ = 106. In all cases we have assumed excess of noise ε = 0.01 SNU.
The red curves (*) describe the case obtained for pure loss and assuming ξ = 1, VM →∞, N¯ →∞
(solid line) and N¯ = 109 (dashed line). Panel (b) focuses on the symmetric configuration of the
relay. The curves are obtained using the same parameters as in panel (a), but setting τA = τB = τ .
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8.4 Results
We use Eq. (8.33) of the non-asymptotic secret key rate in order to quantify the finite
size effects and compare it with the performance of the protocol in the asymptotic regime.
To do so, for the asymmetric configuration of the relay, we plot in the top-panel (a) of
Fig. 8.1 the key rate as a function of Bob’s channel transmissivity, expressed in terms of
dB of attenuation by replacing τB = 10
− dB
10 while the transmissivity of Alice’s channel is
set to τA = 0.98. The attack considered here is a two-mode optimal one, for which g = −g′
with g = min
[√
(ωA − 1)(ωB + 1),
√
(ωB − 1)(ωA + 1))
]
and ωA ∼ ωB ∼ 1.01 [29]. The
reconciliation efficiency is set to ξ = 0.98, and the final key rate is optimized over the
variance of the Gaussian modulation VM and the ratio r = n/N¯ . The black-solid line
gives the asymptotic key rate for very large N¯ (>> 109), while the dashed line is for
block-size N¯ = 109 and the dot-dashed line is obtained for N¯ = 106.
The symmetric case [30], where the parties have the same distance from the relay
(τA = τ = B), is presented in the bottom panel of Fig. 8.1 (b). We set the same values
for the all the parameters as in Fig. 8.1 (a) and optimizing as before. The black solid
line describes again the asymptotic case N¯ →∞ of the symmetric configuration while the
dashed lines is obtained for N¯ = 109 and the dotted one for N¯ = 106.
We notice that the performance of finite-size CV-MDI-QKD converges to the ideal
one if the number of signals exchanged increases. We observe also that for block size 109
the performance of the protocol is not so different from the asymptotic case showing that
the protocol has a sufficiently robust behaviour with respect the finite size effects. In
terms of achievable distance, we can see for example that for the asymmetric case Alice
is considered to be roughly 0.4 km away from the relay and Bob can be 20 km away from
the relay for N¯ =∞ and 19.4 km away from the relay for N¯ = 109 approximately.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we followed the steps of Chap. 6 in order to present a finite-size security
analysis of the CV-MDI protocol in its CV version focusing on the parameter estimation.
This analysis can be seen as an intermediate step towards a final goal that of obtaining a
composable security analysis (see Chap. 9) taking into consideration all the subroutines of
a protocol. In other words, achieving a secret key rate expression sensitive to phenomena
appearing in a realistic situation. The method of parameter estimation is based on a
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Gaussian framework and on the central limit theorem. However, it is made in such a way
so as to take into consideration the optimal amount of signals from the block for the secret
key extraction given a specific setting for the protocol.
Although we have assumed a non-asymptotic analysis, our results show that the pro-
tocol can still achieve high enough secret key rates for metropolitan communication using
state-of-the-art equipment. In particular a range of N¯ = 106 ÷ 109 block size is sufficient
so as to have a performance of 10−2 bits/use under channel excess noise as high as ε = 0.01
(SNU) and an attenuation corresponding to previous distances. Future works, can include
phenomena of preparation noise in Alice’s and Bob’s labs and use discrete encoding in-
stead of a Gaussian. The later approach might be able to manifest phenomena appearing
on communication with repeaters by using the relay configuration as such.
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Chapter 9
Composable security analysis for
CV-MDI-QKD
9.1 Introduction
The secret key rate in a composable security framework is dependent on the effectiveness
of all assumed subtasks during the protocol procedure (see remark in Sec. 3.3) and incor-
porates already finite size effects. This was presented for the one-way protocols assuming
collective attacks in Ref. [17] and expanded for general attacks in Ref. [18]. A similar se-
curity analysis has been given for the CV-MDI protocol (see Chap. 5) in Ref. [35]. Based
on this study, we will explain the adopted channel parameter estimation scheme which
is not based on the central limit theorem assumption and give some insight on how this
secret key rate works. The channel parameter estimation analysis estimates focuses on
the estimation of the CM of the protocol variables instead of the channel parameters sep-
arately and makes use of the optimality of Gaussian attacks [18]. Finally, we present some
numerical results for the secret key rate performance with respect different block sizes.
9.2 Channel parameter estimation without the Central Limit
Theorem
The parameter estimation we present here follows a different direction with respect to
this in Chap. 8. First of all, we assume that Alice and Bob prepare coherent states
by displacing vacuum states according to Gaussian distributed variables (Q′A, P
′
A) and
(Q′B, P
′
B) respectively with variance VM . After the relay output γ = (QZ , PZ) is broadcast,
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the authenticated parties apply displacements to their variables obtaining
QA = Q
′
A − gQ′A(γ) , (9.1)
PA = P
′
A − gP ′A(γ) , (9.2)
QB = P
′
B − gQ′B (γ) , (9.3)
QB = P
′
B − gP ′B (γ) , (9.4)
The estimation procedure is applied on the entries of the CM of the variables above which
is given by
VAB = 〈

Q2A QAPA QAQB QAPB
pAQA P
2
A PAQB PAPB
QBQA QBPA Q
2
B QBPB
PBQA PBQB PBQB P
2
B
〉 =
 xI zI
zI yI
 , (9.5)
where I = diag(1, 1), and
x =
〈Q2A〉+ 〈P 2A〉
2
, (9.6)
y =
〈Q2B〉+ 〈P 2B〉
2
, (9.7)
z =
〈QAQB〉+ 〈PAPB〉
2
. (9.8)
Note that g⋆, where ⋆ stands for any of (Q
′
A, P
′
A, Q
′
B, P
′
B), is an affine functions of γ
that can be optimally chosen as in Ref. [36] to be
g⋆(γ) = u⋆QZ + v⋆ PZ , (9.9)
with
u⋆ =
〈⋆QZ〉〈P 2Z〉 − 〈⋆PZ〉〈QZPZ〉
〈P 2Z〉〈Q2Z〉 − 〈QZPZ〉2
, (9.10)
v⋆ =
〈⋆PZ〉〈Q2Z〉 − 〈⋆QZ〉〈QZPZ〉
〈Q2Z〉〈P 2Z〉 − 〈QZPZ〉2
. (9.11)
for 〈Qz〉 = 〈Pz〉 = 0 for the sake of simplicity. We notice that the parameters u⋆ and v⋆
can be computed directly from the estimated CM.
The diagonal entries x and y of the CM VAB can be calculated by the local data either
of Alice or Bob. The off-diagonal entries corresponding to z can be computed based on
Eq. (9.1–9.4)
z =
〈QAQB〉+ 〈PAPB〉
2
=
= w1〈Q2Z〉+ w2〈P 2Z〉+ w3〈QZPZ〉 , (9.12)
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where we have set
w1 :=
1
2
(
uq′Auq
′
B
+ up′Aup
′
B
)
, (9.13)
w2 :=
1
2
(
vq′Avq
′
B
+ vp′Avp
′
B
)
, (9.14)
w3 :=
1
2
(
uq′Avq
′
B
+ vq′Auq
′
B
+ up′Avp
′
B
+ vp′Aup
′
B
)
. (9.15)
Note that the authenticated parties can locally compute the variances 〈QZ〉, 〈PZ〉 and the
covariance 〈QZPZ〉. This indicates that the parties may exploit the option of completing
the parameter estimation without disclosing their local data. In other words, all their raw
data can be used for both parameter estimation and secret key extraction.
In order to create confidence intervals for the variances of QA, PA, QB, PB, QZ , PZ ,
we associate with them empirical variances for estimators. For example, for the vari-
ance 〈Q2A〉 we have that n−1Σnj=1Q2Aj for n empirical realizations QAj of the variable
QA independently and identically distributed. Then these estimators can be considered
chi-squared distributed after the appropriate rescaling. This holds because the variables
QA, PA, QB, PB are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution (see Eq. A.3.4). This is
a consequence of the fact that we assume a Gaussian attack on the channels due to the
Gaussian optimality in addition to the Q′A, P
′
A, Q
′
B, P
′
B being normally distributed as it is
required by the protocol. This is also true for the variables QZ , PZ since they can be seen
as a linear combination with respect the variables QA, PA, QB, PB and Q
′
A, P
′
A, Q
′
B, P
′
B.
Furthermore, the covariance 〈QZPZ〉 can be expresses as a combination of two terms
〈QZPZ〉 = 1
4
〈(QZ + PZ)2〉 − 1
4
〈(QZ − PZ)2〉 , (9.16)
each one corresponding in a chi-squared distributed estimator
1
n
n∑
j=1
qZjpZj =
1
4n
n∑
j=1
(qZj + pZj)
2 − 1
4n
n∑
j=1
(qZj − pZj)2 (9.17)
since the variables QZj+PZj and QZj−QZj are normally distributed as linear combination
of independent Gaussian variables.
To each of the estimators, which follows a chi-squared distribution, we can apply tail
bounds coming from its corresponding cumulative function. For 〈Q2A〉 these are given by
Pr
{
〈Q2A〉 <
n−1
∑
j Q
2
Aj
1 + t
}
≤ e−nt2/8 , (9.18)
Pr
{
〈Q2A〉 >
n−1
∑
j Q
2
Aj
1− t
}
≤ e−nt2/8 , (9.19)
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and hold similar relations for the other cases. These bounds are calculated with the help
of Chernoff bound [1] using the sub-exponential behaviour of the chi-squared distribution.
Subsequently, for the the covariance term we have that
Pr
{
〈QZQZ〉 >
n−1
∑
j(QZj + PZj)
2
4(1− t) −
n−1
∑
j(QZj − PZj)2
4(1 + t)
}
≤ Pr
{
〈(QZ + PZ)2〉 >
n−1
∑
j(QZj + PZj)
2
(1− t)
}
+ Pr
{
〈(QZ − PZ)2〉 <
n−1
∑
j(QZj − PZj)2
(1 + t)
}
≤ 2e−nt2/8 (9.20)
and
Pr
{
〈QZPZ〉 <
n−1
∑
j(QZj + PZj)
2
4(1 + t)
− n
−1∑
j(QZj − PZj)2
4(1− t)
}
≤ 2e−nt2/8 . (9.21)
Finally, we have that
Pr {x > xmax} ≤ 2e−nt2/8 , Pr {y > ymax} ≤ 2e−nt2/8 , Pr {z < zmin} ≤ 4e−nt2/8 , (9.22)
with
xmax =
1
1− t
∑
j
Q2Aj + P
2
Aj
2n
, ymax =
1
1− t
∑
j
Q2Bj + P
2
Bj
2n
, (9.23)
and
zmin = min
s1,s2,s3∈{−1,1}
∣∣∣∣∣w1n−1
∑
j Q
2
Zj
1 + s1t
+ w2
n−1
∑
j P
2
Zj
1 + s2t
+w3
(
n−1
∑
j(QZj + PZj)
2
4(1 + s3t)
− n
−1∑
j(QZj − PZj)2
4(1− s3t)
)∣∣∣∣∣ , (9.24)
where w1, w2 and w3 are defined in Eq. (9.13-9.15). We set
t =
√
n−1 8 ln (8/ϵPE)
so that
Pr {x > xmax ∨ y > ymax ∨ z < zmin} ≤ ϵPE . (9.25)
Next we investigate the case of an entangling cloner attack for two settings:
1. symmetric attacks in which both communication channels from Alice to the relay
and from Bob to the relay are simulated by a beam-splitter with equal transmissivity
τA = τB = τ ;
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2. asymmetric attacks where the relay is assumed very close to Alice’s lab, τA ≃ 1.
We assume that Alice and Bob’s variables have modulation variance 〈Q′A2〉 = 〈P ′A2〉 =
〈Q′B2〉 = 〈P ′B2〉 = VM , so that the following covariance values are
〈Q′AQZ〉 = −
√
τA
2
VM , (9.26)
〈P ′APZ〉 =
√
τA
2
VM , (9.27)
〈Q′BQZ〉 = 〈P ′BqZ〉 =
√
τB
2
VM , (9.28)
and the covariances of mutually conjugate quadratures vanish. It also holds that 〈QZPZ〉 =
0 and
〈Q2Z〉 = 〈P 2Z〉 =
τA + τB
2
VM + 1 +
ξA + ξB
2
=: ν , (9.29)
where ξA = (1 − τA)(ωA − 1), ξB = (1 − τB)(ωB − 1) are the excess noise variances and
ωA,B are the thermal noise that Eve injects in the channels respectively. Then the only
non-zero displacement coefficients are
uq′A = −
√
τA
2
VM
ν
, (9.30)
vp′A =
√
τA
2
VM
ν
, (9.31)
uq′B = vp
′
B
=
√
τB
2
VM
ν
, (9.32)
that means
w1 = w2 = −
√
τAτB
4
V 2M
ν2
, (9.33)
and w3 = 0. Finally, applying Eq. (9.24) we obtain
zmin =
√
τAτB
2(1 + t)
V 2M
ν
, (9.34)
and similarly, from Eq. (9.23),
xmax =
VM
1− t
(
1− τA
2
VM
ν
)
, (9.35)
ymax =
VM
1− t
(
1− τB
2
VM
ν
)
. (9.36)
9.3 Secret key rate in a composable framework
The secret key rate in a composable framework is given by
rϵ
′
n ≥ r0n −
1√
n
∆AEP
(
2
3
pϵs, d
)
+
1
n
log
(
p− 2
3
pϵs
)
+
1
n
2 log (2ϵ) , (9.37)
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Figure 9.1: Secret key rate vs block size for asymmetric attacks: τA = 0.99 and different values of
τB (from top to bottom the attenuation of the communication channel from Bob to the relay is of
1dB, 2dB, and 4dB). The excess noise is ξA = 0 and ξB = 0.01 (in shot noise unit). Solid lines
are for collective Gaussian attacks, and dashed lines are for coherent attacks. For both kinds of
attack, the overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20.
where ϵ′ = ϵ + ϵs + ϵEC + ϵPE and n is the block size. The main term connected to the
asymptotic secret key rate is
r0n = ξI˜AB − I˜E , (9.38)
where I˜AB and I˜E are the classical mutual information and Holevo information calculated
by the estimated CM given in the previous paragraph and accepting an error for ϵPA
for parameter estimation. We assume that this estimated CM corresponds to a Gaussian
state that minimizes the secret key rate. The parameter ξ ≤ 1 stands for the reconciliation
efficiency and theoretically is dependent on n and on the error ϵEC of the error correction
procedure (for plotting the secret key rate later in this section we assumed that is constant
and ξ = 0.95).
The last term 1n 2 log (2ϵ) accounts for the privacy amplification procedure and is de-
pendent on n and on the privacy amplification parameter ϵPA. The term
1
n log
(
p− 23pϵs
)
is connected to the fact that the state after error correction with probability of success p
is not a product state as it was initially assumed for the calculation of the rate. The term
∆AEP(δ, d) ≤ 4(d+ 1)
√
log (2/δ2)
with δ = 23pϵs compensates for the fact that we use the Holevo information for calculating
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Figure 9.2: Secret key rate vs block size for symmetric attacks and different values of τA = τB
(from top to bottom the symmetric attenuation is of 0.1dB, 0.3dB, 0.5dB, and 0.55dB). The
excess noise is ξA = ξB = 0.01 (in shot noise unit). Solid lines are for collective Gaussian attacks,
and dashed lines are for coherent attacks. For both kinds of attack, the overall security parameter
is smaller than 10−20.
a secret key rate in the non-asymptotic regime. It is also dependent on d, the number of
bits after discretizing the variables of Alice and Bob. Finally, the smoothing parameter ϵs
is a technical parameter that is connected with the fact that initially the number of the
secret bits between Alice and Bob are quantified by the conditional smooth min-entropy
of their variables as is shown in Ref. [53].
For coherent attacks, by applying the results of Ref. [18] we obtain
rϵ
′′
n ≥
n− k
n
r0n −
√
n− k
n
∆AEP
(
2
3
pϵs, d
)
+
1
n
log
(
p− 2
3
pϵs
)
+
1
n
2 log (2ϵ)
− 1
n
2 log
(
K + 4
4
)
, (9.39)
where k is the number of signals used for the energy test that allows us to use to reduce
any general coherent attacks to a Gaussian collective one, K ∼ n is the correction term
that decreases the length of the secret key calculated for collective attacks in return for
extending the security to coherent attacks and ϵ′′ = K
4
50 ϵ
′.
In Fig. 9.1 and Fig. 9.2, this rate is plotted versus the block size n, for different values
of the transmissivities and excess noise, for error correction efficiency of β = 95%. The
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plots are obtained for ϵ = ϵs = ϵEC = ϵPE chosen in such a way to obtain ϵ
′′ < 10−20. The
rate is then obtained by maximizing over k and the modulation VM and for p = 0.99.
9.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented numerical examples of the performance of the CV-MDI pro-
tocol taking into consideration finite-size effects in a composable framework. The statis-
tical analysis of the channel parameter estimation has been given without using a central
limit theorem assumption and thus is more rigorous mathematically for being used in a
non-asymptotic regime. For this reason, it does not give as tight bounds as it may be
manifested by other methods (see Chap. 8). However, it is still in accordance with the
results of the asymptotic analysis of the CV-MDI protocol. In particular, it provides with
almost the same level of performance even for the case of coherent attacks for moderate
block sizes of about 109 confirming the potential of this scheme for the use of metropolitan
telecommunications.
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Uniform fast-fading channels
10.1 Introduction
Apart from the finite size effects (see Chap. 6) that should be taken into consideration in a
realistic description of a protocol, there are also other assumptions that can contribute to
a simulation of a practical situation. One of them is about the temporal variations of the
communication channel between the two authenticated remote users. This is described
by the so-called fading of the channel. In this case, its transmissivity τ is not fixed and
can vary consistent with a given probability distribution [37]. This phenomenon can exist
due to the use of a free-space channel [38] affected by environmental conditions, e.g.,
atmospheric turbulence [39–45].
In other studies, e.g., Ref. [46], both the parties as well as the eavesdropper are sus-
ceptible to variations in the channel transmissivity due the environment. In this section,
based on Ref. [47], we present a basic model considering a uniform distribution for the
variation of the transmissivities and describe an asymmetric situation between the users
and the Eavesdropper encapsulating the worst-case scenario. Here the fading of the chan-
nel is under the complete control of the eavesdropper who can prepare different values of
the transmissivity spontaneously for each channel use.
We present results for the one-way protocol in reverse reconciliation and homodyne
detection (see Chap. 3), the measurement device independent protocol and a setting for
three users connected via a relay (expanding the later in a network configuration as in
Sec. 5.4).
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10.2 Secret key rate with for a fast-fading channel
Under the previous assumption of fading, the transmissivity is quite fast meaning that
the parties have access to its statistical distribution and have no knowledge of its instan-
taneous values. This brings an asymmetry between the eavesdropper and the authorized
parties. More rigorously, this can be expressed by calculating in a different way the two
asymptotic secret key rate terms (see Eq. 3.44) expressing a more conservative perspec-
tive. In particular, given a distribution for the transmissivity we will compute the mutual
information term between the parties IAB with respect its minimum value and we will
replace with the average of the term IE accounting for Eve’s knowledge on the parties
shared data string over it. This will give us the secret key rate with fast-fading
Rfast = ξIAB|τmin − I¯E (10.1)
with ξ ∈ [0, 1] the reconciliation efficiency. On the other hand, in slow- fading both parts
of the asymptotic secret key rate are averaged over the transmissivity distribution. This
is because a slow change of the values of the transmissivity is taken under consideration,
which stays constant for a large number of channel uses resulting in its accurate estimation.
We base our calculations in a simple model for the fading of the transmissivity assuming a
uniform distribution, which, however, encapsulates the main concept of the eavesdropper
tampering with the transmissivity of the channel.
10.3 One-way QKD
Let us assume that we have a fast uniform fading channel with minimum value τmin a
maximum and a maximum value τmax = τmin+∆τ , where ∆τ is the variance of the fading.
We calculate the fast-fading rate by using the asymptotic key rate for fixed transmissivity
values in Eq. (3.44). More specifically, we set in the mutual information IAB the value
τmin and integrate the Holevo function, which is dependent on the transmissivity over the
fast-fading distribution. This results in the following formula
Rfast,∆τ (τmin) = ξ IAB|τ=τmin −
1
∆τ
∫ τmax
τmin
dηIE(η). (10.2)
In contrast, for slow-fading, both Alice and Bob’s mutual information and Eve’s Holevo
information need to be averaged with respect the uniform fading probability distribution
so that
Rslow,∆τ (τmin) =
1
∆τ
∫ τmax
τmin
dη[ξIAB(η)− IE(η)]. (10.3)
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Figure 10.1: Secret key rate is plotted in terms of ηmin for a fast-fading channel with ∆η = 0.2
(dashed blue line), ∆η = 0.5 (solid blue line) and ∆η = 0.6 (dotted blue line). We set ω = 1
(passive eavesdropping), β = 1 (ideal reconciliation) and µ = 106. We compare the results with
the PLOB bound for repeaterless private communications over a lossy channel (black line) [63].
We can see that high rates can be achieved up to losses of about 6 − 7dB, where the rates start
to rapidly decrease. Note that some curves start from non-zero dBs because we need to enforce
ηmin +∆η ≤ 1, otherwise the fading channel may become an amplifier.
The fast-fading secret key rate is illustrated in Fig. 10.1 for ∆η = 0.2, ∆η = 0.5 and
∆η = 0.6 over the minimum of the transmissivities of the fading channel τmin. We compare
these rates with the PLOB bound plotted with respect to the minimum transmissivity τmin,
which sets the limit for repeaterless private communication over a lossy channel [63]. The
fast- and slow- fading secret key rates are presented in Fig. 10.2 over the attenuation in
dB by setting τmin = 10
− dB
10 and ∆τ = 0.1 for the ideal case of ξ = 1, classical modulation
variance VM = 10
6 and pure loss channel ω = 1. In Fig. 10.3, the same cases are illustrated
for ξ = 0.98 and ω = 1.01 after optimizing over the classical modulation variance VM . We
can see that the two key rates are comparable for losses approximately less than 6 dB.
10.4 Continuous-variables measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution
In this section, we assume that the two parties are found in the same distance with
respect the relay (symmetric configuration). Each channel connecting them with the relay
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Figure 10.2: Comparison between the key rates for fast and slow fading versus τmin. We plot the
secret key rate for the fast-fading channel (lower blue line) and slow-fading channel (upper black
line) for ∆τ = 0.1. We also set VM = 10
6, ω = 1 (passive eavesdropping) and β = 1 (ideal
reconciliation). Performances are comparable within the range between 0 and 6 dB.
is assumed to be a fading channel whose transmissivity follows a uniform probability
distribution. Eve’s thermal noise is the same for both channels ωA = ωB = ω and fixed.
We modify Eq. (5.17) appropriately in order to simulate the fast-fading of the channels.
In more detail, we calculate the mutual information IAB setting τA = τB = τ and then we
replace with minimum of the transmissivities τmin.
Subsequently, we integrate the Holevo information IE depended on the transmissivities
τA and τB over their uniform fading probability distribution of both transimmisivities.
Each one of them is described by the same τmin and τmax = τmin + ∆τ , where ∆τ is the
fading variance. We finally obtain the following secret key rate expression
RMDIfast (τmin) =ξ IAB|τ=τmin −
1
(∆τ)2
×∫ τmax
τmin
∫ τmax
τmin
dηAdηBIE(ηA, ηB). (10.4)
In Fig. 10.4, we present the secret key rates for β = 1, ω = 1 and very large modulation
µ ≃ 106, while we set ∆η = 0.1 (solid lines). We see that the performance for fast-fading
is not so far from that related to slow-fading and that is achievable with a standard lossy
channel. We also present the same instances but for β = 0.98, optimizing over µ and
setting ω = 1.01 (dashed lines). In the latter case, the eavesdropper may also optimize
her attack by exploiting correlations in the injected environmental state.
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Figure 10.3: Comparison between fast and slow-fading. As in Fig. 10.2 but for ω = 1.01, β = 0.98,
and optimized over VM .
10.5 CV-MDI-QKD three-user network
Let us assume the star configuration of Eq. (5.20) with fading affecting the channels,
where the transmissivities follow uniform distribution between τmin and τmax = τmin+∆η.
For obtaining an expression with the uniform fast-fading we need to integrate the Holevo
bound over the distribution of the three channel transmissivities and compute the mutual
information in the worst-case scenario by replacing with the minimum transmissivity.
Thus, we write
Rstarfast,∆τ (τmin) =ξ Imin|τ=τmin
−
∫∫∫ τmax
τmin
IE(η)
(∆τ)3
dη, (10.5)
The rate for ∆η = 0.05 and ω = 1 is optimized over µ and shown in Fig. 10.5. From the
figure, we can see that the performance is comparable to the case of slow-fading, where
the parties’ mutual information is averaged over the statistical distribution.
10.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the one-way protocol, the measurement device indepen-
dent protocol and a three user variation of it in terms of fast-fading. Fading of a channel is
the phenomenon associated with the non-constant transmissivity of the channels connect-
ing the parties during the communication process. This can be a consequence of changes
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Figure 10.4: Performance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol in symmetric configuration assuming two
fading channels in the channels with ∆η = 0.1 and no excess noise (ω = 1). We plot the secret key
rate versus ηmin for fast fading (lower blue solid line) and slow-fading (upper black solid line). We
also show the standard case of a non-fading lossy channel (middle red solid line) which is plotted
in terms of the expectation value of η, i.e., η¯ = ηmin +
∆η
2 . Here we set β = 1 and µ = 10
6. Then
we plot the same rates but for β = 0.98, ω = 1.01 and optimizing over µ (see the corresponding
dashed lines).
in environmental conditions or in a more pessimistic scenario can result from of the eaves-
dropper’s tampering with the channels transmissivity. The first case can sometimes be
considered slow in the sense that the transmissivty can remain constant for sufficient num-
ber of channel uses part of which the parties can use so as to estimate it. However these
changes may follow a more complicated distribution dependent on different aspects of the
setting and the experimental equipment.
On the other hand, the distribution on the second case can be based on a simple
model of the uniform distribution since here we assume a mechanical process executed by
an antagonist. In this case, we consider is considering a fast change of the transmissivity
randomly chosen from the eavesdropper for each channel use. This results in a disadvan-
tage for the users, who have access to the distribution only in the end of the protocol
and thus are forced to assume its minimum for their variable correlations. However, the
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Figure 10.5: The secret conferencing key rate versus ηmin in a star configuration of the three-party
CV-MDI-QKD network assuming fast-fading channels (blue solid line) and slow-fading channels
(black solid line) with the same variance ∆η = 0.05. We also include the rate of the protocol in the
presence of lossy channels with transmissivity η¯ = ηmin +
∆η
2 . For all the plots we have optimized
over µ ∈ [2, 20] and set ω = 1.
eavesdropper’s information is averaged over the distribution.
Although the last situation describes a more pessimistic secret key rate, our results
show that the performance of the aforementioned protocols with fast-fading are comparable
with the corresponding slow-fading cases. In fact, for typical distance ranges for each
protocol, we notice high enough performances which implies a robustness to such channel
fading assumptions.
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Chapter 11
Discrete phase-encoding in
coherent states: asymptotic
security analysis in thermal-loss
channels
11.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present results from Ref. [64], where we have extended the security
analysis from considering a pure loss channel (see Sec. 3.6) to the thermal loss case. In
order to estimate the excess noise of the channel in this case, we assume that the parties
have send a sufficient amount of coherent states modulated with a Gaussian distribution
that are not participating in the secret key extraction. Since the protocol is not a fully
Gaussian protocol we have to use the density matrix notation in the Fock basis which we
have to truncate for the numerical calculations.
11.2 Thermal-loss channel assumption
The calculations are based on Eve’s system. According to the entangling cloner attack,
Eve’s input states is a TMSV state described by the density matrix (see Eq.2.53)
ρEe(λ) = (1− λ2)
∞∑
n=0
(−λ)(k+l)|k〉〈l| ⊗ |k〉〈l|, (11.1)
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Figure 11.1: Realistic secret-key rate (bits/use) over the attenuation (decibels) in direct reconcil-
iation for N = 4 and z = 0.1. We plot the rate for a pure-loss channel (upper solid line) and a
thermal-loss channel with mean photon number n¯ = 0.01 (middle dashed line) and n¯ = 0.1 (lower
solid line).
with λ = tanh
[
1
2arcosh(2n¯+ 1)
]
, where n¯ is the mean number of thermal photons. The
beam spliter operation that is applied on Alice’s and Eve’s modes is given by Eq. (2.66)
U(θ) = exp
[
θ
(
aˆ†AaˆE − aˆAaˆ†E
)]
, (11.2)
where θ = arcos(
√
τ). According to Fig. 3.8, we notice that the global output state of Bob
(mode B) and Eve (modes e and E′) for a given k is given by
ρBE′e(θ, ak, λ) = U(θ)ΠA(ak)ρEe(λ)U
†(θ), (11.3)
where Alice had prepared the stateΠA(ak) := |ak〉〈ak|. In order to find Eve’s state after
the propagation of the channel we have to trace with respect to Bob’s mode B obtaining
ρEve|k := ρE’e(θ, ak, λ) = TrB[ρBE′e(θ, ak, λ)]. (11.4)
As a result, Eve’s average state can be obtained as the convex sum of Eve’s conditional
states from Eq. (11.4)
ρEve(θ, z, λ) =
1
N
N∑
k=0
ρEve|k. (11.5)
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Therefore, based on the von Neumann entropy of the previous states we can evaluate the
Holevo information defined in Eq.(2.82)
χ(Eve : XA) = S(ρEve)− 1
N
N∑
k=0
S(ρEve|k). (11.6)
The entropy of the state ρEve|k does not depend on k, i.e., the phase of the amplitude of
the coherent state that Alice has sent (see remarks after Def. 2.6.4). Thus Eq. (11.6) can
be simplified to
χ(Eve : XA) = S(ρEve)− S(ρEve|k) (11.7)
for any k.
The calculation of the mutual information between the authorized parties is based on
the discussion of Sec. 3.6.2. The main difference is that Bob’s distribution is dependent
on the channel thermal mean photon number described by the following relation
p(b|ak)(n¯) = Tr[Π(b)ρ(
√
τak, (1− τ)n¯)Π†(b)], (11.8)
where Π(b) := |b〉〈b| and ρ(√τak, (1 − τ)n¯) is a displaced thermal state with amplitude
√
τak and mean photon number (1 − τ)n¯. By the calculation in the Appendix B.3, we
obtain
p(b|ak)(n¯) =
exp
[ |b−√τak|2
1+(1−t)n¯
]
pi(1 + (1− τ)n¯) . (11.9)
Subsequently, we apply Bayes’ rule and calculate the probability distribution p(ak|b)(n¯).
Then by replacing it in Eq. (2.75), we obtain the mutual information.
Finally, we compute the secret key rate
R(n¯) = I(XA : XB)(n¯)− χ(Eve : XA) (11.10)
with I(XA : XB)(n¯) being the mutual information between Alice and Bob calculated from
Eq. (11.9) and χ(Eve : XA) is given by Eq. (11.7). In Fig. 11.1, we plot this secret key
rate over the attenuation for a protocol with N = 4 and z = 0.1. In particular, we see
that the performance obtained in the presence of thermal noise n¯ = 0.01 is not so far from
the performance achievable in the presence of a pure-loss channel. In other words, the
four-state protocol is sufficiently robust to the presence of excess noise. In Fig. 11.2, we
optimize the rate with respect to the radius z for both pure loss and thermal loss channels.
In the lower panel, we can see the difference between the two optimal radii corresponding
to the two cases. In Fig. 11.3, we also see incremental changes in the security threshold
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Figure 11.2: Protocol for N = 4 in direct reconciliation. Upper panel: Key rate is optimized
over z ∈ (0, 2) and plotted versus attenuation. We assume a pure loss channel (solid line) and
a thermal loss channel with n¯ = 0.1 (dashed line). Lower panel: We plot the optimal value of z
versus attenuation, for the pure loss case (solid line) and the thermal loss case (dashed line).
of the protocol by increasing the number of encoding states, e.g. from N = 4 to 10,
assuming a thermal loss channel. In fact, we can see that after N > 7 the threshold
saturates showing that there is no advantage by using a larger number of states.
In order to estimate the excess noise ϵ we assume a variation of the original protocol:
Alice may send Gaussian-modulated decoy coherent states to Bob mixed with coherent
states used for the key. At the end of all quantum communication, Alice informs Bob in
which instances she was sending decoys so that they can use their data to compute ϵ. As
expected, we also have that direct reconciliation restricts the use of the protocol to low
loss. The case is different for reverse reconciliation that we study below.
Let us now consider the reverse reconciliation case. Let us assume that the probability
of Alice sending a state with amplitude ak given that Bob measured b is given by p(ak|b)(n¯).
Then Eve’s conditional state can be given by the average state of an ensembles of states
ρEve|k each one associated with the previous probability. Therefore, Eve’s conditional state
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Figure 11.3: We plot the security thresholds in direct reconciliation, i.e., maximum tolerable excess
noise ϵ versus transmissivity τ for N = 4 (red line), N = 7 (blue dashed line) and N = 10 (green
line) with z = 1.5. The threshold saturates for N > 7 showing that there is no advantage in terms
of achievable distance by increasing the number of states. We have also included a figure containing
a magnified area so as to clarify this saturation tendency.
is given by a convex sum as follows
ρE′e|b =
N−1∑
k=0
p(ak|b)(n¯)ρEve|k. (11.11)
The conditional states ρEve|k is given in Eq. (11.4) and p(ak|b)(n¯) comes from Eq. (11.9).
Therefore, we may derive S(ρE′e|b) by using the definition of Eq. (2.77). Then we replace
in the Holevo information function of Eq. (2.82) and calculate the secret-key rate
R(n¯) = I(XA : XB)(n¯)− S(ρEve) +
∫
d2b p(b)(n¯)ρE′e|b, (11.12)
where p(b)(n¯) := 1N
∑N−1
k=0 p(b|ak)(n¯), I(XA : XB)(n¯) is calculated based on Eq. (11.9) and
ρEve is given in Eq. (11.5). Numerically, we compute this rate by truncating the Hilbert
space to a suitable number of photons, which is of the order of ≃ 10− 15 photons for the
specific regime of parameters considered.
In Fig. 11.4, we plot the reverse reconciliation secret key rate over the attenuation for
the four-state protocol N = 4 with radius z = 0.1 and excess noise ϵ = 0.001. We can
see that the protocol is sufficiently robust to excess noise, achieving a rate of 6 × 10−4
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Figure 11.4: Realistic secret key rate (bits/use) over the attenuation (decibels) in reverse recon-
ciliation for N = 4 and z = 0.1. We have plotted the rate for a pure-loss channel (upper black
line) and a thermal-loss channel with excess noise ϵ = 0.001 (lower red line). Both these rates
coincide with the corresponding rates achievable by a Gaussian protocol modulating coherent states
with variance VM = 0.02.
bits per channel use for attenuation values of about 20 dB. In this regime of energy,
the performance of the protocol coincides with that of a Gaussian protocol modulating
coherent state with modulation variance VM = 2z
2 (and performing heterodyne detection
on the channel output). On the contrary, for larger energies, e.g., for a constellation radius
z = 1, the rate of the four-state protocol does not coincide with its Gaussian counterpart,
as also illustrated in Fig. 11.5. Note that here we have not optimized over z so as to
be able to compare the actual potential of a discrete modulation protocol(in principle
meaning ideal reconciliation) against a protocol with Gaussian modulation and ξ < 1 (see
also Fig. 3.12). Here the four-state protocol can achieve a rate of the order of 4 × 10−3
bits per channel use for attenuation values of about 15 dB and excess noise ϵ = 0.01. So
for this order of noise, which is a realistic consideration coming from experiments [24,29],
the protocol can achieve distances up to 75 km.
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Figure 11.5: Realistic secret key rate (bits/use) over the attenuation (decibels) in reverse reconcili-
ation over the attenuation (decibels) for N = 4 and z = 1. We have plotted the rate for a pure-loss
channel (lower solid line) and a thermal-loss channel with excess noise ϵ = 0.01 (lower dashed
line). The corresponding secret key rate for the protocol with Gaussian modulation (VM = 2) has
also been plotted for the case of pure-loss channel (upper solid line) and thermal-loss channel with
excess noise ϵ = 0.01 (upper dashed line). We see that, for this regime of energies, the rate of the
four-state protocol does not coincide with the rate of the Gaussian protocol.
11.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented an extension of the security of the protocol using N equidis-
tant coherent states from the origin of the phase space to channel that has excess noise.
More specifically, we used the assumption of the entangling cloner attack, which although
is not the optimal attack, since the distribution of the signal coherent states is not a
Gaussian, it still describes the realistic situation of a communication channel based on
optical fibres. In this study, we did no make any assumption with respect to a Gaussian
approximation and we found that the reverse reconciliation version of the protocol man-
ifests the appropriate robustness regarding loss and channel noise for communication at
metropolitan mid-range distances.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we contributed in the research about CV-QKD. Our main goal was to obtain
security analysis of the Gaussian protocols using thermal states and of the measurement
device independent protocol incorporating finite size effects. This analysis allows us to
assess the security and performance of the protocol in terms of achievable distance or level
of the secret key rate in the realistic situation of finite-number exchanged signals as the
core aspect of a practical application. Based on this analysis, we provided with results for
both protocols showing their performance with respect to the relevant parameter of the
block size. We noticed that for moderate block sizes their performance is quite close to the
performance considered in the asymptotic regime, that made these protocols particularly
promising for metropolitan area applications. More specifically, for the thermal state
protocol, we noticed that for achieving reasonable key rates using signals in the lower
frequencies, we should constrain the distance of the nodes to very small values and use
larger block sizes.
In addition, such analysis can be considered as an intermediate step of achieving a
stronger notion of security, that in a composable framework. We showed from which pa-
rameters such an analysis is dependent on for measurement-device-independent protocol
and proposed a channel parameter estimation that is not based on the central limit the-
orem. As a secondary goal, we expanded the asymptotic secret key analysis of protocols
such as the coherent states protocol with Gaussian modulation, the CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol and a three-user star network configuration to an asymmetric scenario for the users
against the eavesdropper associated with the fast fading channels. We investigated the
performance of such protocols and observed that it was close compared to the symmetric
scenario of slow fading confirming that they are quite robust even to a such a pessimistic
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assumption. Finally, we assumed that the parties use a thermal loss channel for exchang-
ing an arbitrary number of phase-encoded coherent states. To the best of our knowledge
this has not been done without a Gaussian approximation, although such an assumed
entangling cloner attack simulates the most realistic situation of a typical link in telecom-
munications. Here, we noticed the expected decrease in the performance of the protocol
due to the additional excess channel noise but the reverse reconciliation version turns out
to be able to achieve performances compatible with mid-range metropolitan distances.
12.1 Outlook
We have seen that protocols with discrete modulation can have almost the same perfor-
mance with protocols with Gaussian modulation when the energy used for the encoding
is quite small. It would be very interesting to see the implication of this for protocols
using discrete encoding of thermal states or with discrete-modulation used in the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol. Furthermore, a finite-size analysis for such protocols with discrete
encoding would be a challenging step since in that case we cannot use the assumption of
Gaussian variables for the channel parameter estimation.
12.1.1 Fast-fading channels
Our calculations in this chapter took into consideration a uniform distribution as the
simplest case of fading but still incorporating the aspect of asymmetry that it was our main
research goal. However, it would be very interesting in a future work to see a comparison
of fast fading with other studies considering more complex distributions according to
atmospheric turbulence phenomena. A starting point will be by assuming values for the
variance of the uniform distribution so that it can describe such phenomena as above.
Furthermore, our calculations have been made only for symmetric configurations. It
would be interesting to at some point an investigation to be made for asymmetric configu-
rations in terms of distance from the relay. However, in any case, the parties can estimate
the smallest of the transmissivities and build their secret key rate on this assumption.
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Useful elements of estimation
theory
A.1 Bi-variate Normal distribution
According to the method of maximum likelihood estimation, for a bivariate normal distri-
bution X = (X1, X2), the estimators for the mean µ = (µ1, µ2) and the covariance matrix
V are given by
µˆ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi (A.1.1)
V̂ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Xi − µˆ)(Xi − µˆ)T (A.1.2)
where Xi is the i-th statistical realization out of m realizations of X.
A.2 The Central Limit Theorem
The central limit theorem states that, assuming m ≫ 1 realizations X1, X2, . . . , Xm of a
random variable X with unknown density function f , mean µ and variance σ2 < ∞, the
sample mean
X¯ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi (A.2.3)
is approximately normal with mean µ and variance σ2/m.
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A.3 Chi-squared distribution
In order to estimate the mean value of a variable Y , that depends on the square of a
variable X for which we have m realizations, we can use the following result: For m
realizations Xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, of a normally distributed variable X, having mean µ
and unit variance, the variable
Y =
m∑
i=1
X2i ∼ χ2 (k, λ) (A.3.4)
is distributed according to the χ2 distribution with k = m degrees of freedom and λ = mµ2.
The mean value and variance of the chi-squared distribution is given by
E(Y ) = k + λ, (A.3.5)
and
Var(Y ) = 2(k + 2λ). (A.3.6)
Remark:A chi-squared distributed variable X ∼ χ2(k, λ) tends to a normal distribu-
tion for k →∞ or λ→∞ (see Ref. [65]).
A.4 Confidence intervals
An error of ϵ = 10−10 defines a significance level δ = 2ϵ for the symmetric confidence
interval of a Gaussian distributed variable X ∼ G(µ, σ2) with mean µ and variance σ2.
This means that the probability of X to be in the interval {µ− x, µ+ x} is given by
P (µ− x < X < µ+ x) = 1− δ. (A.4.7)
Subsequently, we have that
P (X > µ+ x) = δ/2 (A.4.8)
P (Y > x/σ) = δ/2 (A.4.9)
Φ(x/σ) = 1− δ/2, (A.4.10)
where Y = X−µσ is following a standard normal distribution and Φ(x/σ) is the correspond-
ing cumulative distribution function. This results in
x = Φ−1(1− δ/2)σ
where Φ−1(1− δ/2) is approximated to be ∼ 6.5 for the given error ϵ.
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A.5 Optimal combination of estimators
Let us assume to have two estimators sˆ1 and sˆ2, with variances σ
2
1 and σ
2
2, for the same
quantity s acquired by different processes. We then compute the optimal linear combina-
tion of the variances by the following formula
σ2opt =
σ21σ
2
2
σ21 + σ
2
2
. (A.5.11)
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Calculations for phase encoded
states
B.1 Orthonormal basis for N coherent states
Suppose that we have N coherent states described by amplitudes ak for k = 0, 1 . . . N − 1.
Since these states are non-orthogonal we can have a matrixV that describes their overlaps,
which are given by
Vij = 〈ai|aj〉 = exp
[
−1
2
(|ai|2 + |aj |2 − 2a∗i aj)] . (B.1.1)
For a constellation of states as described before and after the attenuation due to the
propagation through a pure-loss channel, the overlaps for Bob are given by
V Bij = 〈
√
τai|
√
τaj〉 = exp
[
τz2
(
ei
2pi
N
(j−i) − 1
)]
, (B.1.2)
while for Eve we may write
V Eij =〈
√
1− τai|
√
1− τaj〉 =
= exp
[
(1− τ)z2
(
ei
2pi
N
(j−i) − 1
)]
. (B.1.3)
Then, according to the Gram-Schmidt procedure, we can derive an orthonormal basis
{|i〉} = {|0〉, |1〉, . . . |N − 1〉} for the subspace spanned by these N coherent states. As a
result, each state will be expressed as a superposition of this basis vectors as
|ak〉 =
k∑
i=0
Mki|i〉 (B.1.4)
where the Mki can be computed by the algorithm
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Mk0 = V0k,
Mki =
1
Mii
(
Vik −
∑i−1
j=0M
∗
ijMkj
)
if 1 ≤ i < k,
Mki = 0 otherwise,
Mkk =
√
1−∑k−1i=0 |Mki|2 for k > 0.
Then the density matrix ρ(ak) = |ak〉〈ak| is given by
ρ(ak) =
k∑
i,j=0
Mk,iM
∗
k,j |i〉〈j|, (B.1.5)
and the average state takes the form
ρ =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
ρ(ak) =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
k∑
i,j=0
Mk,iM
∗
k,j |i〉〈j|. (B.1.6)
Diagonalizing the previous state, we then compute its von Neumann entropy.
B.2 Asymptotic state for a continuous alphabet
Let us express a coherent state in the Fock basis, i.e,
Π(a) := |a〉〈a| = e−|a|2
∞∑
n,m=0
an(a†)m√
n!
√
m!
|n〉〈m| (B.2.7)
In order to be able to do numerical calculations, we have to truncate the Fock space and a
very good approximation is given by n ∼ 2|α|2. As a result, in this truncated Fock basis,
the state will be
Πtranc(a) ≃ e−|a|2
2⌊|a|2⌋∑
n,m=0
an(a†)m√
n!
√
m!
|n〉〈m|. (B.2.8)
For N coherent states in a constellation with radius z, the average state can be written
as
ρ =
e−z2
N
2⌊z2⌋∑
n,m=0
z(n+m)
∑N−1
j=0 e
i 2pi
N
(n−m)j
√
n!
√
m!
|n〉〈m|, (B.2.9)
where the non zero terms are the terms with m − n = N and n = m. For a continuous
distribution p(aφ) =
1
2pi of phase-encoded coherent states |aφ〉 with fixed radius z = |a|
and φ = arg(aφ), Eq. (B.2.9) becomes
ρ =
e−z2
2pi
2⌊z2⌋∑
n,m=0
z(n+m)
∫ 2pi
0 e
iφ(n−m)dφ√
n!
√
m!
|n〉〈m| =
=e−z
2
2⌊z2⌋∑
n=0
z2n
n!
|n〉〈n|. (B.2.10)
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B.3 Displaced thermal state
A thermal state with mean number of photons n¯ may be expressed as a convex sum of
coherent states |a〉 according to the P-Glauber representation as
ρ(n¯) =
∫
p(a, n¯)|a〉〈a|d2a, p(a, n¯) = 1
n¯pi
e−|a|
2/n¯. (B.3.11)
Applying the displacement operator D(d), which displaces a coherent state |a〉 with am-
plitude a into a coherent state |a+d〉 with amplitude a+d, we obtain a displaced thermal
state
ρ(d, n¯) = D(d)ρ(n¯)D†(d) =
=
∫
p(a, n¯)D(d)|a〉〈a|D†(d) d2a =
=
∫
p(a, n¯)|a+ d〉〈a+ d|d2a =
=
∫
p(c− d, n¯)|c〉〈c|d2c (B.3.12)
with p(c − d, n¯) = 1n¯pie−|c−d|
2/n¯. According to equation Eq. (B.2.7), we can have a repre-
sentation of this state in Fock basis, so that
ρ(d, n¯) =
∫ ∞∑
n,m=0
p(a− d, n¯)e−|a|2 a
n(a∗)m√
n!
√
m!
|n〉〈m| d2a (B.3.13)
The state after projecting to a coherent state |b〉 (heterodyne measurement), i.e., Π(b)ρ(d, n¯)Π†(b),
will be calculated as∫
d2a
∞∑
n,m,k,l,i,j=0
p(a− d, n¯)e−|α|2 α
n(α∗)m√
n!
√
m!
e−|b|
2 bk(b∗)l√
k!
√
l!
×
× e−|b|2 b
i(b∗)j√
i!
√
j!
|k〉〈l||n〉〈m||i〉〈j| = (B.3.14)∫
d2a p(a− d, n¯)e−|a|2e−2|b|2
∞∑
n,m=0
(ab∗)n(ba∗)m√
n!
√
m!
×
×
∞∑
k,j=0
bk(b∗)j√
k!
√
j!
|k〉〈j|, (B.3.15)
and, applying the trace operation, we obtain the probability distribution
p(b|d)(n¯) =
∫
d2a
1
n¯pi
e−|a−d|
2/n¯e−(|a|
2+|b|2−b∗a−ba∗) =
=
1
n¯pi
∫
e−|a−d|
2/n¯e−|a−b|
2
d2a =
=
1
(n¯+ 1)pi
exp
(−|b− d|2/(n¯+ 1)) . (B.3.16)
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Let us write this probability distribution for the thermal output state of a thermal-loss
channel with transmissivity τ and mean thermal photon number n¯ when applied to an
input coherent state |ak〉 (d :=
√
τak). We find Eq. (11.9).
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Abbreviations
TMSV two-mode squeezed vacuum
CV Continuous-variables
QKD quantum key distribution
MDI measurement-device-independent
CM covariance matrix
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